通过考察、比较“基体说”的核心概念“基体”与如来藏思想、唯识思想的核心概念dhātu, 可以说明dhātu类概念绝非是基体之含义, 如来藏与唯识思想也就绝非“基体说”。讨论是围绕“基体”的三种最基本含义——即现象法所依存之一元性本体、常一自在之我、现象法之一元发生因展开的。

By comparing the concept " locus " of " dhātu-vāda " with the central idea dhātu of tathāgata-garbha-theory and vijnaptimatrata-theory, can argues that the concept of dhātu and its associates are very different from the concept of locus. Consequently, the theory of tathāgata-garbha and vijnaptmatrata are not " dhātu-vāda ".The paper highlights three basic meanings ofthe concept of locus, namely, locus as the monistic substance underlying the phenomenal world, locus as permanent self, and locus as t he monistic cause of the phenomenaly world.