Content of 冷战史研究 in our journal

Published in last 1 year |  In last 2 years |  In last 3 years |  All Please wait a minute... For Selected: Download Citations EndNote Ris BibTeX Toggle Thumbnails Select On the Crisis of Korean Peninsula in Middle-late 1960s DENG Feng Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2015, 47 (3): 63-75.   DOI: 10、16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2015.03.007 Abstract （459）   HTML （4）    PDF（pc） （2471KB）（1221）       Knowledge map    Save After Chinese People’s Volunteer Army returned to China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) took this opportunity to initiate the peaceful unification of the peninsula, aiming to alleviate its tension with the U.S. However, the U.S. implemented the policy of “hostility, restriction and non-contact” in its “asymmetric relationship” with DPRK, gave up the peaceful unification of DPRK guided by South Korea, maintained the separation of the peninsula and handicapped the development of DPRK by strengthening the power of South Korea. This brought a serious crisis to Korea Peninsula in middle-late 1960s. Especially, due to Johnson Administration’s promotion of the normalization of the relations between South Korea and Japan, the alliance of the U.S., Japan and South Korea made a considerable threat to the national security of DPRK. In addition, Kim Il Sung attempted to unify the peninsula in a way of Vietnamese Reform. As a result, constant mild conflicts occurred between DPRK and South Korea and the tension in the peninsula was intensified. However, the U.S. excerted contradictory policies: on the one hand, it prevented South Korea from attacking DPRK for the stability of the peninsula because of its involvement in Vietnamese War; on the other hand, it increased to a great extent its military aids to South Korea, which intensified the rivalry of South Korea objectively. Therefore, the alliance of the U.S. and South Korea was a great hindrance that prevented the alleviation of the crisis of Korea Peninsula. The U.S. had limited choice when handling the crisis, so it was inevitable that its policies towards the peninsula came into a dilemma. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Heated Exchanges on European Collective Security between the United States and the Soviet Union, 1954-1957 Liu Kui Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2015, 47 (3): 76-86.   DOI: 10、16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2015.03.008 Abstract （480）   HTML （4）    PDF（pc） （1931KB）（1299）       Knowledge map    Save It was the first time for the Soviet Union to propose formally the proposal of establishing the European Collective Security System at the Berlin Four-power Talks of Foreign Ministers on Feb 10th. 1954. After that, the problem of European collective security had become one of the foci for a long time until the burst of the dispute on the Berlin Issue between America and the Soviet Union in 1958. According to relevant archives, it is easy to find the basic difference between America and the Soviet Union on it. The Soviet Union wanted to establish the European Collective Security System and detoured the dispute of the German Issue between the West and the East for achieving more purposes such as stabilizing the division of Germany and Europe which was good for the controlling of its zone in Europe, weakening the West alliance and excluding the American troop from Europe and so on. America stood for some point of view that Germany must reunify in the free elections firstly then considered the problem of European Security, reunified Germany must join the NATO, and it objected the Soviet suggestion of setting up the system of European Collective Security which would weaken the force of the West alliance. For the sake of the immense divergence, the Soviet Union and America were unable to agree on each other’s viewpoint on European Collective Security at the Berlin Four-power Talks of Foreign Ministers and subsequent conferences. This paper argues that there are two main reasons about this, one is that these two countries didn’t truly quit the containment policy which was based on the power, the second is that it was hard to form consensus on European collective security between these two countries due to divergences over the German question, especially different ideas which they had on the sequence of solving the German Issue and European collective security. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select On the Making of the British Communist Party’s Crisis of 1956 CHU Qing-dong Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2015, 47 (3): 87-94.   DOI: 10、16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2015.03.009 Abstract （417）   HTML （5）    PDF（pc） （1491KB）（1444）       Knowledge map    Save The Crisis of 1956 was the most serious and critical situation the Party was in since its foundation. The making of the crisis attributed to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Secret Report, and Hungarian Revolution, etc. As the members of the British Communist Party got to know the contents of the Secret Report, the Communist Party’s Historians’ Group emerged as the nucleus of vocal opposition to the Party. However, in order to keep the cooperation between international communism and the Party, the leadership of the British Communist Party suppressed free and public discussion on the questions raised by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This caused the dissatisfaction and ‘rebellion’ of the communist intellectuals. What’s worse, British Communist Party supported the Soviet Union’s army to invade Hungary, while the communist intellectuals required the Party to cut clear line with Soviet Union. With the leave of many members and intellectuals during the fierce competition, the Party suffered from the Crisis of 1956. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select On the Soviet Union’s Policy of Compensation Claim against Germany after World War Ⅱ LI Feng-yan Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2013, 45 (6): 72-78.   Abstract （664）   HTML （15）    PDF（pc） （572KB）（1004）       Knowledge map    Save After World War Ⅱ, the compensation claim against Germany was greatly concerned by the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK because it was related to the national security and economic reconstruction of Soviet Union, the destiny of Germany, and the trend of international situations in post-war Europe. Since the Soviet Union’s compensation claim policy formulated before the Yalta conference had encountered the opposition of the U.S. and the UK, and the agreement reached by hard negotiation became a dead letter, the Soviet Union had no choice but claim compensation only in the German occupied area in the Soviet Union. The formulation, adjustment and implementation of the Soviet Union’s policy of compensation claim against Germany was reciprocal causation with the evolvement of major powers’ relations from cooperation to the Cold War after World WarⅡ. Meanwhile, it deeply changed the Soviet Union, Germany, and the post-war international situation in Europe. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select The Soviet Union and the Korean War: An Examination Centering on Soviet Activities at the United Nations SONG Xiao-qin Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2013, 45 (6): 79-85.   Abstract （767）   HTML （12）    PDF（pc） （507KB）（1541）       Knowledge map    Save In the early period after World War Ⅱ, the Korean election under the UN inspection had to be held only in southern Korea due to the confrontation of the Soviet-American relations, which caused the separation of Korea into two parts. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. promptly intervened in the war in the name of the UN under the condition that the Soviet Union hadn’t returned to the Security Council in time. With the early military success of Chinese Peoples’ Voluntary Army, the Soviet Union rejected to accept the UN ceasefire suggestion, which led to the missing of a chance to end the War as early as possible. When the War came into a deadlock, the communication between the Soviet Union and the US through the UN channel promoted to open the door of the armistice negotiations. After the issue of prisoners of war (POW) was submitted into the UN, the Soviet’s adherence to the principle that all POWs should be repatriated unconditionally made the UN reach no conclusion. In short, the Soviet-American game on the Korean issue in the UN framework often results in a zero-sum rather than a win-win situation, which has had an important impact on the intensification of the Korean War and the delay of the armistice negotiations. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Radical Revolution versus “Conservative Alternative:”Reflections on Competing Paths toward Modernity in East Asia during the Cold War CHEN Jian Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2012, 44 (4): 23-34.   Abstract （1520）   HTML （8）    PDF（pc） （1376KB）（1283）       Knowledge map    Save As two different alternatives of modernity construction, radical revolution and “conservative alternative” were in antagonism and competition in East Asia during the early stage of the Cold War. “Radical revolution” seemed to gain the upper hand for a time, but it could not be so dominating as to exclude all “the others” thoroughly. After 1970s, the success of “conservative alternative” characterized by the rising of the “Four Asian Tigers,” together with the self-transformation in domestic and foreign policies in nations of radical revolution, has not only molded and remolded the construction of modernity in East Asia, but also led to the transform of the Cold War in East Asia. With the end of the Cold War, there is a confluence of radical revolution and “conservative alternative” in many aspects. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Safeguarding the Soviet Union’s Strategic Interests in Far East: On the Origins of the Korean War and Stalin’s Decisionmaking Motive SHEN Zhi-hua Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2012, 44 (4): 35-48.   Abstract （1850）   HTML （27）    PDF（pc） （1394KB）（1859）       Knowledge map    Save By the end of 1949, Stalin had used every conceivable stratagem in order to prevent North Korea from launching a war of unification against South Korea. But by late January 1950, he suddenly had a change of mind and decided to wholeheartedly support Kim Il sung to achieve this goal. Whether or not the United States would intervene was only a precondition, not the end. To draw U.S. attention to the Far East was the end result, but not the motive. To encourage and promote the Asian revolution was only the superficial phenomenon, but not the shift in Soviet diplomatic strategy. The signing of the Sino Soviet alliance treaty in 1950 meant that the Soviet Union would lose its only exit to the Pacific Ocean and warm water port. Without doubt, this would cause great loss to Soviet strategic interests. As a result, the Soviet Union would lose its strategic backing in Asia. The reason why Stalin decided to support Kim Il sung’s attack on South Korea was that he hoped to regain, or safeguard Soviet tradition strategic prop in the Far East through this military action. No matter what the outcome might be, the military conflict in the Korean peninsula would guarantee Soviet strategic aim as designed by Stalin. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Mao Zedong and the Eastern Information Bureau: The Transfer of Leadership in Asian Revolution SHEN Zhi-Hua Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2011, 43 (6): 27-37.   Abstract （1486）   HTML （10）    PDF（pc） （1265KB）（2249）       Knowledge map    Save When the Communist Information Bureau was established in October 1947, Stalin had no plan to set up such a Communist international organization in Asia. On the eve of the total victory of Chinese revolution, Mao Zedong started to talk about establishing an Eastern Information Bureau with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although Stalin proposed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should lead Asian revolution and agreed in principle to the idea of an Eastern Information Bureau, he was not in favor of immediate action. After hearing Moscow’s opinion, the CCP started to train Communist cadres coming from Asian countries. After entering the Korean War, the CCP gained actual leadership of Asian revolution. Although Eastern Information Bureau was not formally established, the CCP assumed the leadership in guiding revolution in Asia through opening MarxistLeninist academy and special schools to bring Asian Communist representatives to Beijing. In particular, the CCP gradually played a more dominant role in the Korea issue. After the Korean War, China and the Soviet Union advocated a peaceful coexistence policy toward the West. The issue of Eastern Information Bureau was no longer approached. China remained the center of Asian revolution until the early 1960 s. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select The Dissolution of Communist International and the Establishment of USSR Cooperation Strategy after World War Ⅱ CUI Hai-Zhi Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2011, 43 (6): 38-43.   Abstract （1199）   HTML （6）    PDF（pc） （1281KB）（1556）       Knowledge map    Save Communist International (Cominter), which in its practical activities was responsible to carry out the world revolution, was not only a tool of the Soviet foreign policy, but also became its obstacle in certain conditions. After the outbreak of the war between Soviet Union and Germany, the establishment of international antifascist alliance made the relations between Soviet Union and America and Britain entered into a new stage. But, with a continuing victory of the allies against Germany in the war, the worry of America and Britain toward the Soviet Union increased, and this made the relationship between them fall into crisis from 1942 to the first half of 1943. In order to eliminate this crisis, assure the final victory of the antifascist war, and resolve the problem about the postwar arrangement at the same time, Stalin made a decision, as a friendly gesture to the West, to dissolve the Cominter in May 1943. The dissolution of the Cominter marked the beginning of postwar cooperation between USSR and U.S. and Britain. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select The Dispute over Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission between U.S. and ROK in the Perspective of “Alliance Dilemma” (1954—1956) LIANG Zhi Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2011, 43 (6): 44-49.   Abstract （1514）   HTML （6）    PDF（pc） （1268KB）（2196）       Knowledge map    Save The new leaders of Soviet Union actively called for peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries after 1953, and there was a relaxation of tensions between East and West. Syngman Rhee worried that U.S. would abandon the Republic of Korea, as a price of buying peace. Therefore, he provoked a dispute over the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to create tension. The Eisenhower Administration believed that unilateral actions by ROK most likely started hostilities which would get U.S. involved. For this reason, U.S. used tactics of appeasement and pressure against Rhee. On June 9, 1956, the U.N. command removed the NNSC personnel from ROK and the dispute was settled. The dispute over NNSC between U.S. and ROK tells us that the main reason for U.S.ROK crisis of confidence is the difference between global considerations of the U.S. and local considerations of the ROK. The U.S. often examines closely the Korean Peninsula problem from an Asian or even global angle, and isn’t willing to be entrapped by unilateral actions of ROK, and the ROK always judges U.S. global and Asian policies on the basis of its national security interests and worries about being ignored or even abandoned by U.S. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select A Historical Investigation on North Korean Interns in Beijing: Basic Information and Changes of Policy DONG Jie Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2011, 43 (6): 50-56.   Abstract （1316）   HTML （5）    PDF（pc） （1255KB）（1499）       Knowledge map    Save From 1950 onward, Beijing became one of the 39 cities in China where some North Korean workers were accepted and trained as interns. In this project of North Korean interns, the local government of Beijing followed every instruction from the central government and considered the whole program as a political task. It upheld the spirit of internationalism and provided these interns with care and convenience in every way, from their technical study to daily entertainment. When the local government of Beijing fell into a diplomatically passive position due to the leaking of new techniques, it placed priority on politics and generously made them available to North Korea for fear of damaging the two countries’ relations. The project of North Korean interns came out of the two countries’ agreement on the political objectives, and ended due to the deviation of their political ideologies. As an epitome of economic relations between China and North Korea, the project shows an influence that the political relation has exerted on the economic sphere, and also reflects a structural defect of the two countries’ relations. Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2009, 41 (1): 1-13.   Abstract （1722）   HTML （21）          Knowledge map    Save Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2009, 41 (1): 1-1.   Abstract （1638）   HTML （20）          Knowledge map    Save Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2009, 41 (1): 14-24.   Abstract （1688）   HTML （13）          Knowledge map    Save Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0） Select Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2009, 41 (1): 25-31.   Abstract （1858）   HTML （15）          Knowledge map    Save Related Articles | Metrics | Comments（0）