William Roskey, “The Second Korean Conflict, ” Military History, Vol.16, Issue4(October 1999), p.39; Mitchell Lerner, “Mostly Propaganda in Nature: Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War, ” North Korean International Documentation Project Working Paper#3, December 2010, pp.1—2.
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Richard Mobley, “Pueblo: A Retrospective, ” Naval War College Review, Vol.54, Issue2(Spring 2001), pp.98—117; Mitchell Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002; Mitchell Lerner, “A Failure of Perception: Lyndon Johnson, North Korean Ideology, and the Pueblo Incident, ” Diplomatic History, Vol.25, No.4(Fall 2001), pp.647—675; Mitchell Lerner, “A Dangerous Miscalculation: New Evidence from Communist-Bloc Archives about North Korea and the Crises of 1968, ” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.6, No.1(Winter 2004), pp.3—21; David P.Houghton, “Reconstructing the U.S.Response to the Pueblo Hostage Crisis of 1968: A Cognitive Perspective, ” A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Portland, Oregon, July 2007; Sergey S.Radchenko, “The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives, ” Cold War International History Project Working Paper#47; Jack Cheevers, Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo, New York: NAL Caliber, 2013;黑川修司:《“普韦布洛”号事件、美国的情报活动与1968年危机》,《东京女子大学纪要论集》57(1),第99—123页;梁志:《“普韦布洛”号危机决策与美国的国际危机管理》,《中国社会科学》2011年第6期,第167—183页;梁志:《1968年“普韦布洛”号危机初期的美苏交涉》,《俄罗斯研究》2011年第4期,第130—146页;梁志、孙艳姝:《冷战时期美韩同盟信任危机析论——以1968年美韩外交争执为中心》,《东北师大学报》(哲学社会科学版)2013年第3期,第77—83页。 |
Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, Annapolis Md: Naval Institute Press, 2003;邓峰:《美国与EC-121危机:对1969年美国大型侦察机被朝鲜击落事件的研究》,《世界历史》2008年第2期,第14—23页;孙艳姝:《韩国应对朝鲜击落美EC-121侦察机事件初探》,《社会科学战线》2010年第9期,第240—243页。 |
James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 2008。这部档案集共收录了300份文件, 其中相当一部分是涉及EC-121危机前后美韩关系的双边档案。 |
“The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Clark)to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ”March 28, 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States(hereinafter referred to as FRUS), 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1984, pp.818—819;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, p.824. |
1950年7月14日, 李承晚致函美国太平洋陆军最高司令官道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟(Douglas MacArthur), 表示“在目前的敌对状态继续之期间, 把韩国陆、海、空军的作战指挥权转让(给美国)。”麦克阿瑟接受了韩国的请求。 |
Yong-Pyo Hong, State Security and Regime Security:President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953—60, New York:St.Martin's Press, Inc., 2000, pp.42—43;Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation:Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953—1960, Seoul:Yonsei University Press, 2001, pp.81—82;William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War:A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2002, pp.189—190;“The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee)to the President Eisenhower, ”April 9, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, pp.902—903;“The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs)to the Department of State, ”April 15, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, p.912. |
“The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs)to the Department of State, ”April 14, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, pp.906—907;“Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Johnson)to the Secretary of State, ”April 8, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part1, p.896;Kwang Sub Kwak, “The US-ROK Alliance, 1953—2004:Alliance Institionalization, ”Ph.D.dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 2006, pp.72—73. |
Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation:Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953—1960, pp.117, 119—120;“Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, ”October 21, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part2, p.1544. |
“The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs)to the Department of State, ”December 31, 1953, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part2, p.1679;“The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee)to President Eisenhower, ”February 4, 1954, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part2, pp.1745—1747;“Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board(Staats)to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay), ”December 30, 1954, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part2, pp.1943—1944. |
“Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board(Staats)to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay), ”December 30, 1954, in FRUS, 1952—1954, Vol.15, Korea, Part2, p.1948. |
Sydney D.Bailey, The Korean Armistice, London:MACMILLAN ACADEMIC and PROFESSIONAL LTD, 1992, p.174;Stephen JinWoo Kim, Master of Manipulation:Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953—1960, pp.201—202, 225;“Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Korean Ambassador(Yang), ”January 7, 1955, in FRUS, 1955—1957, Vol.23, Part2, Korea, Washington:United States Government Printing Office, 1993, pp.2—3;“Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense(Anderson)to the Secretary of State, ”January 13, 1955, in FRUS, 1955—1957, Vol.23, Part2, Korea, pp.7—8;“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”March 8, 1955, in FRUS, 1955—1957, Vol.23, Part2, Korea, pp.50—52;“Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, ”June 8, 1956, in FRUS, 1955—1957, Vol.23, Part2, Korea, p.280;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1955—1957, Vol.23, Part2, Korea, pp.460—461. |
Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation:Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953—1960, pp.216—226. |
“Intelligence Memorandum, ”November 8, 1966, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, Washington:United States Government Printing Office, 2000, p.209;“Memorandum of Conversation, ”September 15, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.274. |
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Quiet War:Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966—1969, ”The Journal of Military History, Vol.64, No.2(April 2000), pp.441—442. |
1964—1969年, 韩国先后五次向越南派兵, 总数为47 874人。关于韩军赴越问题, 可参见Charles K.Armstrong, “America's Korea, Korea's Vietnam, ”Critical Asian Studies, Vol.33, No.4(2001), p.532;Jonathan Colman and J.J.Widén, “The Johnson Administration and the Recruitment of Allies in Vietnam, 1964—1968, ”History, Vol.94, Issue316(October 2009), pp.483—504;Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War:South Korea's Search for National Security, ”in Byung-kook Kim and Ezra F.Vogel(eds.), The Park Chung Hee Era:The Transformation of South Korea, Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2011, pp.403—429;赵虎吉:《揭开韩国神秘的面纱——现代化与权威主义:韩国现代政治发展研究》, 北京:民族出版社, 2003年, 第132页。 |
“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”August 23, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.270—272;“Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak, ”December 21, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.303;Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Quiet War:Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966—1969, ”p.444. |
“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.309—310;“Report by the Historical Studies Division of the Dept.of State Entitled:‘Chronology of Diplomatic Activity in the Pueblo Crisis’, ”October 1, 1968, in Declassified Documents Reference System(hereinafter referred to as DDRS), Gale Group, 2014, CK3100150479;Lyong Choi, “The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee:1968—1979, ”Ph.D.dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012, pp.32—33. |
Jong Dae Shin & Kihl Jae Ryoo, “ROK-DPRK Relations in the late 1960s and ROK Diplomacy, ”International Workshop on Foreign Relations of the Two Koreas during the Cold War Era, May 11, 2006, Seoul, Korea, p.88. |
梁志、孙艳姝:《冷战时期美韩同盟信任危机析论——以1968年美韩外交争执为中心》, 第77—83页。 |
“Article by Richard M.Nixon, ”undated, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969—1972, Washington:United States Government Printing Office, 2003, pp.10—21;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969—1972, pp.48—49;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969—1972, pp.49—50;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969—1972, p.50;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969—1972, pp.53—55. |
Larry Berman and Stephen R.Routh, “Why the United States Fought in Vietnam, ”Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.6, Issue1(2003), p.198;“The President's Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To Limit the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not To Seek Reelection, ”March 31, 1968, reproduced from“The American Presidency Project”, available at:http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28772&st=&st1=; The Department of State Bulletin, Vol.58, No.1503, April 15, 1968, pp.481—486;资中筠:《战后美国外交史:从杜鲁门到里根》(下), 北京:世界知识出版社, 1994年, 第561、579—582页。 |
Robert M.Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's“More Flags”:The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War, London:McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994, pp.37—45, 49—50;Se Jin Kim, “South Korea Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political Impact, ”Asian Survey, Vol.10, No.6(June 1970), p.529;Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “In the Service of Pharaoh?The United States and the Deployment of Korean Troops in Vietnam, 1965—1968, ”Pacific Historical Review, Vol.68, No.3(August 1999), pp.439 —440;Lyong Choi, “The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee:1968—1979, ”pp.44—46;“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”September 19, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.276—278;“Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, ”October 31, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.284—288;“Memorandum of Conversation, ”November 13, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.288—290;“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”November 25, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.291—293;“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”December 6, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.297;“Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak, ”December 21, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.303;“Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant(Rostow)to President Johnson, ”December 29, 1967, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.305—306;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, pp.59—61;“Editorial Note, ”in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.410;“Telegram From the President's Special Assistant(Rostow)to President Johnson in Texas, ”April 13, 1968, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.411. |
“National Security Study Memorandum 9, ”January 23, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document186. |
“Special National Intelligence Estimate, ”January 30, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, Washington:United States Government Printing Office, 2010, pp.1—2. |
“National Security Study Memorandum 34, ”March 21, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.8. |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”March 19, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.4—7. |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”April 1, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.8—10. |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”April 2, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.11—15. |
事实表明, 此时韩国对自身安全的担心绝非杞人忧天:其一, 1960年代末韩国军队配备的依旧是二战时期的老式武器, 朝鲜半岛南北方军事装备水平差距极大; 其二, 美国并不重视韩军现代化问题。比如, 1969年财政年度1.39亿美元对韩军援中只有900万美元用于韩军现代化。而且, 援助下拨的速度非常迟缓。1968年年初, 美国曾同意向韩国增拨1亿美元军援。但直到1969年5月, 华盛顿仅提供了约1300万美元援助。总的来说, 那时美国已经答应却尚未交付给韩国的军事装备价值大约2.3亿美元; 其三, 自1966年秋朝鲜半岛局势持续恶化以来, 美国从未按照韩国的希望对朝鲜采取大规模“报复”行动。参见“Commander in Chief Pacific Command History, ”Vol.2, 1969, Historical Branch, Office of the Joint Secretary Headquarters, CINCPAC, 1970, pp.134, 136;“Korean MAP Supplemental, ”May 7, 1969, in Digital National Security Archive(hereinafter referred to as DNSA), KO00038;梁志、孙艳姝:《冷战时期美韩同盟信任危机析论——以1968年美韩外交争执为中心》, 第79—82页。 |
“The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown, ”United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Volume3, Office of Archives and History, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, 1989, pp.7—8. |
“Cables on North Korean Shootdown of U.S.Aircraft; Includes Attachments, ”April 15, 1969, in DNSA, KO00018;“Pyongyang's Motivations in Downing U.S.Reconnaissance Plane, ”April 16, 1969, in DNSA, KO00022;Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea:The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, pp.106—110. |
“Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger, ”April 15, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document198;“Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ”April 15, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.17—20;“Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ”April 15, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.20—21;“Memorandum From the President's Military Adviser(Haig)to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ”April 16, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.26—27;“Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, ”April 18, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.38—42;William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball, “Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert:Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969, ”Cold War History, Vol.3, No.2(January 2003), p.120;Kim Seung-Young, “American Elites'Strategic Thinking Towards Korea:From Kennan to Brzezinski, ”Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.12, No.1(March2001), p.198;Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea:The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, pp.116—117, 122—125;[美]理查德·尼克松:《尼克松回忆录》(中), 裘克安等译, 北京:商务印书馆, 1979年, 第24—27页; [美]亨利·基辛格:《白宫岁月:基辛格回忆录》(第1册), 傅惟慈译, 北京:世界知识出版社, 1980年, 第421、424—425页。 |
The Department of State Bulletin, Vol.60, No.1558, May 5, 1969, p.377. |
“Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, ”April 16, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.31;Lyong Choi, “The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee:1968—1979, ”pp.60—61;Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea:The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, p.132. |
“Memorandum of Conversation between Singjin Chyun, Kwang Soo Choi, Winthrop G.Brown, Leroy E.Debold, ”April 16, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document205. |
《韩国外交部部长就美国侦察机被击落事件发表声明》, 1969年4月17日, 《大韩民国外交文书(1969年)》, 缩微胶片号:G-0016, 首尔大学中央图书馆藏。 |
“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”April 18, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.43—44;“Summary of President Park Chung Hee's Meeting with U.S.Ambassador to South Korea Porter, ”April 18, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document218. |
Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea:The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, pp.132—133. |
5月1日, 韩国政府出台了一份名为《韩国政府基本立场》的文件, 强调以下三点立场:朝鲜的寻衅行为意在破坏韩国发展、分化美韩关系、挑起全面战争; 韩国并不希望同朝鲜开战; 为了防止朝鲜误判, 韩国必须在经济和社会发展方面赶超朝鲜并加强国防建设。相应地, 美国应加速向韩国提供军事援助、提高美韩共同防卫能力。《韩国政府基本立场》, 1969年5月1日, 《大韩民国外交文书(1969年)》, 缩微胶片号:G-0016, 首尔大学中央图书馆藏。 |
“Memorandum of Conversation between Singjin Chyun, Kwang Soo Choi, Winthrop G.Brown, Leroy E.Debold, ”April 18, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document214. |
“EC-121 Incident; North Korean Intentions; U.S.Military Assistance, ”April 28, 1969, in DNSA, KO00034. |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”May 1, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.47—49. |
事实上, 私下里尼克松政府已经在考虑向韩国提供补充军事援助的问题。4月19日, 参谋长联席会议在致国防部长的一份备忘录中建议对韩国增拨1.08亿美元军援, 主要目的在于提高韩军的反渗透能力。5月7日, 莱尔德向基辛格提出了这项建议。然而, 26日基辛格在致尼克松的备忘录中指出, 莱尔德已认识到政府内部没有多少人支持对韩国补充军事援助计划, 该计划很难在国会获得通过。因此, 尼克松决定不再要求国会讨论增加对韩国军事援助一事。30日, 国务卿和国防部长向太平洋美军司令通报了总统的决定。详见“Korean MAP Supplemental, ”May 7, 1969, in DNSA, KO00038;“Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)to President Nixon, ”May26, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.51;“Commander in Chief Pacific Command History, ”pp.147—149, 156。 |
“2nd U.S.-ROK Defense Cabinet-level Meeting Joint Statement, ”June 4, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document240;“2nd U.S.ROK Defense Cabinet Member-level Meeting Results Report Summary, ”July 2, 1969, in James Person, Mitchell Lerner, etc(eds.), Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula:1968—1969, document244. |
“Commander in Chief Pacific Command History, ”pp.141—142, 154—159. |
“Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, ”August 1, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.79—81.不仅如此, 韩国甚至请求美国帮助装备7个预备役师, 并承担32亿美元的相关费用。参见“Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, ”August 14, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part 1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.91。 |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”August 21, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.96—102;“Summary of a San Francisco, California, Meeting between President Richard M.Nixon and South Korean President Park Chung Hee, ”August 21, 1969, in DDRS, CK3100670704-CK3100670710. |
“Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)to the Chairman of the NSSM 27 Steering Group(Brown), ”September 16, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.106. |
“Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ”November 24, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.117;“National Security Decision Memorandum 48, ”March 20, 1970, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.148;“Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)to President Nixon, ”August 22, 1970, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.181—182;“National Security Decision Memorandum, ”September 2, 1970, in DNSA, PR00395. |
详见陶文钊主编:《中美关系史(1949—1972)》, 上海:上海人民出版社, 1999年, 第503—565页; 张曙光:《尼克松“解冻”中美关系的战略考虑初探》, 《冷战国际史研究》(第四辑), 北京:世界知识出版社, 2007年, 第302—318页。 |
“Memorandum of Conversation, ”August 21, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.98;“Memorandum of Conversation, ”September 1, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.274—275;“Memorandum of Conversation, ”September 28, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.281—283;“Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park, ”November 29, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.294—295;“Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, ”November 25, 1972, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.434. |
“National Intelligence Estimate, ”December 2, 1970, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.211;“Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, ”September 23, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.279—280;“Memorandum of Conversation, ”September 28, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.281—283;“Memorandum From John H.Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ”February 12, 1972, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.316;“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ”May 19, 1972, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.350;Kim Hyung-A, Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee:Rapid Industrialization, 1961—79, New York:RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, pp.108—109. |
《韩国驻美大使关于美国舆论的报告》, 时间不详, 《大韩民国外交文书(1969年)》, 缩微胶片号:G-0016, 首尔大学中央图书馆藏。 |
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Quiet War:Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966—1969, ”pp.441—442;“Notes of the President's Meeting with Cyrus R.Vance, ”February 15, 1968, in FRUS, 1964—1968, Vol.29, Part1, Korea, p.380. |
“Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, ”April 16, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.30. |
Richard A.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea:The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, p.120. |
“Draft Study Prepared by the Interagency Korean Task Force, ”undated, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Kore |
“Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, ” February 2, 1971, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part 1, Korea, 1969—1972, pp.224—226; “Commander in Chief Pacific Command History, ” Vol.2, 1970, Historical Branch, Office of the Joint Secretary Headquarters, CINCPAC, 1971, p.390; Seung-young Kim, “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970—82, ” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.12, No.4(December 2001), p.55; Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea, ” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, Issue 2(June 2000), pp.273—274. |
详见梁志:《1970年代初朝韩关系的缓和及其影响》,“亚洲的冷战:历史和影响”国际学术研讨会会议论文,2012年3月3日;Seung-young Kim, “American Elites' Strategic Thinking Towards Korea: From Kennan to Brzezinski, ” p.198。 |
“Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger), ” November 24, 1969, in FRUS, 1969—1976, Vol.19, Part1, Korea, 1969—1972, p.117. |
实际上,美韩同盟内部的这种心理状态绝非特例实际上,美韩同盟内部的这种心理状态绝非特例,至少在“美台同盟”中亦同样存在。为了防止美国放弃台湾,蒋介石政权千方百计地促使华盛顿与之缔结“同盟”。具有讽刺意味的是,美国之所以最终同意和台北签署《共同防御条约》,部分原因在于希望借此束缚台湾“反攻大陆”的行动,把美国卷入中国内战的可能性降至最低。但事实证明,防务条约本身仅仅能够缓解美国和台湾的担忧,而无法彻底消除双方之间的相互猜疑,1958年第二次台海危机清楚地说明了这一点。详见詹奕嘉:《长期措施还是权宜之计?——试析第一次台海危机中美国对台政策的调整》,《冷战国际史研究》(第二辑),北京:世界知识出版社,2006年,第175—188页;黄文娟:《没有硝烟的“战争”——1958年台海危机期间的美台关系》,《冷战国际史研究》(第二辑),第189—203页;Hsiao-ting Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited: Chiang Kai-shek, Baituan, and the 1954 Mutual Defense Pact, ” Diplomatic History, Vol.37, No.5(November 2013), pp.971—994。与此相类似,当我们将视线投向苏朝同盟和苏中同盟时,便可发现在“普韦布洛”号危机和第二次台海危机中,莫斯科极力避免因为当地紧张局势与美国发生一场全面战争,而平壤和北京则几乎完全按照自己的国家统一诉求制定和执行对美韩和美台的政策。详见梁志:《1968年“普韦布洛”号危机初期的美苏交涉》,第130—146页;沈志华:《无奈的选择:冷战与中苏同盟的命运(1945—1959)》(下),北京:社会科学文献出版社,2013年,第658—689页。 |