网络出版日期: 2018-05-22
基金资助
国家自然科学基金项目"大学治理、财务管理和价值增值的关系研究"（项目编号：71573090）；国家社科基金项目"规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究"（项目编号：09BJY031）。
Contract Reference Points, Executive Compensation Incentives and Excess Perquisites
基于契约参照点理论，以中国A股上市公司2009—2014年的数据为样本，探究契约参照点、高管薪酬激励与超额在职消费三者之间的关系，其研究结果发现：契约参照点与超额在职消费之间具有正向关系；高管薪酬激励有利于降低超额在职消费，对契约参照点与超额在职消费之间的关系具有负向调节作用，且存在产权和经理人市场化程度方面的差异。研究还发现：与"八项规定"政策实施前相比，该政策实施后国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励对契约参照点与超额在职消费之间关系具有负向调节作用，说明这一政策得到了有效落实。上述结论对如何进行高管薪酬契约设计以及解决高管超额在职消费问题提供了相应的证据支持与参考。
杨蓉 . 契约参照点、高管薪酬激励与超额在职消费[J]. 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2018 , 50(3) : 113 -125 . DOI: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2018.03.011
Based on the contract as a reference point theory, this paper takes the data of China's listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as samples to study the relationships among contract reference points, compensation incentives and excess perquisites. We find that there is a positive relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites; compensation incentives benefit to reduce excess perquisites, and play a moderator role in inhibiting the relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites, with significant differences due to the elements of companies' ownership and manager market degree. The study also shows that compensation incentives of state-owned listed companies have a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites after the implementation of the "eight regulations" policy. The research findings can provide relevant evidences that support and guide how to design the contracts of executive compensations reasonably and solve the problem of excess perquisites effectively.
陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,2005,《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》,第2期。
耿云江、王明晓,2016,《超额在职消费、货币薪酬业绩敏感性与媒体监督——基于中国上市公司的经验证据》,《会计研究》第9期。
江伟,2011,《市场化程度、行业竞争与管理者薪酬增长》,《南开管理评论》第5期。
黎文靖、岑永嗣、胡玉明,2014,《外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究》,《南开管理评论》第4期。
权小锋、吴世农、文芳,2010,《管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵》,《经济研究》第11期。
万华林、陈信元,2010,《经理人市场、薪酬契约有效性与管理层侵占——基于国有企业经理人"59岁现象"的研究》,《2010中国会计与财务研究国际研讨会论文集》。
王建军、刘红霞,2015,《高管团队内部薪酬差距对投资效率影响的实证研究——以A股国有控股上市公司为例》,《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》第3期。
王曾、符国群、黄丹阳、汪剑锋,2014,《国有企业CEO"政治晋升"与"在职消费"关系研究》,《管理世界》第5期。
吴成颂、唐伟正、钱春丽,2015,《制度背景、在职消费与企业绩效——来自证券市场的经验证据》,《财经理论与实践》第5期。
徐细雄、刘星,2013,《放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败》,《管理世界》第3期。
徐细雄、谭瑾,2014,《高管薪酬契约、参照点效应及其治理效果:基于行为经济学的理论解释与经验证据》,《南开管理评论》第4期。
杨蓉,2016,《"八项规定"、高管控制权和在职消费》,《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》第1期。
张月明、吴春雷,2014,《企业高管在职消费、超额在职消费与企业价值——"代理观"与"效率观"的理论协调及其实证检验》,《广东财经大学学报》第5期。
Albuquerque A.M., Franco G.D. and Verdi R.S., 2013, "Peer Choice in CEO Compensation", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.108, No.1.
Bizjak J., Lemmon M. and Naveen L., 2008, "Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?" Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.90, No.2.
Cai H., Fang H. and Xu L.C., 2014, "Eat, Drink, Firms and Government: An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures of Chinese Firms", The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.54, No.1.
Faulkender M. and Yang J., 2013, "Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking",Review of Financial Studies, Vol.26, No.3.
Fehr E., Hart O. and Zehnder C., 2009, "Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation",Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol.7, No.2-3.
Fehr E., Hart O. and Zehnder C., 2011, "Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence",American Economic Review, Vol.101, No.2.
Fiegenbaum, A., Hart, S. and Dan, S., 1996, "Strategic Reference Point Theory", Strategic Management Journal, Vol.17, No.3.
Hart O., 2001, "Financial Contracting", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.39, No.4.
Hart O. and Moore J., 2008, "Contracts as Reference Points",Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.123, No.1.
Luo W., Zhang Y. and Zhu N., 2011, "Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidence from an Emerging Market",Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.17, No.2.
/
| 〈 |
|
〉 |
国家社会科学基金学术期刊资助入选期刊