The history of international law begins with the works of Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria in the 1530s, who laid the foundation for the “law of peoples” when discussing Spain’s right to possess American lands and defending Spain’s imperial conquest. Subsequently, a system of justification for European imperial expansion was formed by the end of the 17th century after the arguments of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and others from different perspectives. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 introduced a hierarchy of states, leading to the emergence of the “Concert of Five Powers”. After 1873, civilization became the standard for dividing the world, and the doctrine of “the standard of civilization” categorized countries into civilized, barbaric, “semi-civilized”, senile, or incapable groups, with respective treatments for each category. Although international law has been fully institutionalized, it remains discriminatory. For instance, liberal powers like the United States often violate international law without suffering from punishment. Overall, while containing some universally applicable elements (such as diplomatic immunity), international law is neither international nor legal from a realist perspective, and it is essentially an opinion or ideology, serving as a tool for powerful entities. Finnish scholar Martti Koskenniemi argues that international law is a hegemonic technique in the Gramscian sense and it is subject to appropriation and subversion. While defenders believe that international law is better than nothing, critics consider it an evil tool in the disguise of good.

Through combing the history of the theory and practice of international law dominated by the Western world, British historian Perry Anderson not only elucidates how a certain “civilization” as a factual concept defines the meaning of “civilization” as a value concept, but also reveals the peculiar blend of the “reasonable” and the “unreasonable” in uncovering the dialectics of civilization and barbarism. It is only with a keen sensitivity to both the speaker’s and the listener’s contexts within the narrative that we can extract the maximum benefit from such an “Anderson narrative.” This accomplishment can subsequently aid in seizing the historical opportunity for establishing a new civilization for mankind.

Perry Anderson points out that the so-called “international law” is a product of Eurocentrism and is often utilized by imperial powers. Having recognized this fact, it becomes particularly important to delve further into thinking about how to respond to various ideologies and issues in today’s China and world as a whole. Looking back at the pioneering modern Chinese thinkers like Wang Tao, Yang Du, and Yan Fu, we see that their advocacy for learning from the West did not stem from a belief that the West was the pinnacle of civilization. Rather, they were characterized by a sense of confusion and internal contradictions. Zhang Junmai and Liang Qichao began to reassess the cultural relationship between China and the West, shifting their intellectual focus toward questioning “whether it’s possible to alter the world’s barbaric norms”. Meanwhile, Lu Xun and Sun Yat-sen explored strategies to prevent China from embracing a form of “barbaric patriotism” during its modernization journey. It seems that the aspirations of early modern Chinese thought have yet to be fully realized, and currently, the world exhibits a troubling trend towards “barbarization”. However, this very trend underscores the necessity for us not to abandon our pursuit of “civilization” and global justice, despite the existence of “barbarism” elsewhere.

In the wake of the “great geographical discovery”, various theories emerged in Europe to address relationships with foreign countries, establish new norms, and create a new global order. These theories promoted the formation of a global order and an ideological value system dominated by Eurocentrism. Starting with Perry Anderson’s “civilization hierarchy theory”, we can examine the thinking of modern European thinkers on the construction of global order. We can observe that the principles of international law, the theory of civilization hierarchy, and the free-market economic system have not only constituted the core content of the global value system dominated by the West since modern times but have also served as the ideological foundation for constructing global order. Today, the academic community must engage in careful and deep reflection on this matter. While critiquing the theory of civilization hierarchy, we should not lose sight of the standard of civilization. Similarly, while recognizing the global expansion of free trade, it is essential to confront “trade suspicions” based on national interests. Amidst significant global changes, an urgent task is to assimilate these intellectual resources, broaden our horizons, and rebuild the global order.

Perry Anderson is not original in combing the history of modern international law with “civilization” as a clue, nor is it his initiative to critically discuss the occidentalist core of “civilization”. Nevertheless, his paper “The Standard of Civilization” reveals to us the core of imperialism and colonialism in the underlying logic of the discourse system of international law, as well as the integrated role played by the concept of “civilization”. By demonstrating how a parochial concept masquerading as universalism can define, suppress, and even eradicate the uniqueness of diverse human groups, this seminal work stimulates the imagination for a more equitable and progressive international order. Such an order would respect cultural differences and distinctiveness, and it would be constructed through multilateral dialogue mechanisms. On the one hand, this paper seeks to engage in a critical dialogue with Anderson’s work to reinforce the missing elements of his historical narrative; on the other hand, it also aims to complement the construction efforts that critical theories intentionally overlook, by proposing a theory for building a “human community with a shared future”. This proposition is grounded in the concept of civilization inherent in the Chinese cultural tradition as a guiding thread.

Space in the social and historical life of human beings is no longer merely a material property external to humans; rather, it is the spatial practice of human beings as well as its representations. Therefore, from the perspective of critiquing spatial fetishism, the common-sense spatial places and objects are penetrated by the flow of spatial practice and the supply and demand of energy for action. Consequently, the material space in the realm of “real estate” is inevitably transformed into a relational field that constrains the occurrence of social practice. From the critical perspective of contemporary bourgeois spatial production, the scientific methodology of Marx’s Capital can be employed to establish a new critical theory of the political economy of space.

Chinese philosophy has been a hot topic in the academic community in recent years. To philosophically justify “Chinese philosophy, ” the fundamental question is as follows: How is it possible to make philosophy speak Chinese? Past scholarship frequently confined debates to Chinese linguistic structures, inadvertently rendering the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy a contested and elusive subject. Gadamer’s contemporary hermeneutics approaches this issue by grounding it in the understanding of existence beyond linguistic structures, asserting that philosophy requires no privileged language and that philosophical thought transcends grammatical scrutiny. The philosophical capacity of a language is determined not by the presence of a copula (such as ‘to be’), but rather by its ability to enable the comprehension and articulation of existence’s universal meaning through its linguistic framework. Demonstrating remarkable conceptual synergy with contemporary linguistic scholarship, Gadamer’s hermeneutic framework embodies a paradigm-shifting reconfiguration of the language-thought dialectics, which transcends mere morphological particularities, engaging fundamentally with the existential comprehension and hermeneutic construction of universal signification through linguistic mediation. It will explicitly foreground that the narrative architecture of the Chinese language can equally encapsulate philosophical and metaphysical insights and it is the things expressed in language itself that determines thought. Within the cultural tapestry of China, aesthetics emerges as the authentic metaphysical and universal modality of thinking. Gadamer’s discourse furnishes a novel foundational argument and ideological perspective on how the Chinese language articulates philosophy, alluding to both the theoretical concerns of constructing Chinese philosophy and the fulfillment of this philosophical imperative. Against the backdrop of philosophy’s own evolution, Gadamer’s theory radically inaugurates a universal horizon for appreciating the diversity of philosophical expressions and cognitive pathways that diverge from Western linguistic paradigms

Xunzi’s theory of argumentation is characterized by a focus on “discourse”. For instance, he advocates for “speaking with benevolence” and “keeping silent when one has doubts” in the context of “saying”. Meanwhile, in the realm of “arguing”, he emphasizes the need to “argue with sufficient reasons” and “argue with justice”. In general, he asserts that argumentation should adhere to three fundamental ethical principles: first, it should prioritize the overall interests of human society as its core value and starting point; second, the subject should be open to others and respect the equal rights and interests of all participants in the argument; third, the views of all parties should be genuinely recognized from the heart and not influenced by any external forces. However, when viewed through the lens of Habermas’s ‘discourse ethics’, Xunzi’s conception of discourse still has some shortcomings. These include his negative attitude towards discourse, presupposing outcomes and then attempting to reach consensus through discourse, disapproval of multiple values, failure to treat all speech and everyone’s right to discourse equally, and a lack of discussion on the nature of speech itself. However, if his position on value prioritization is set aside, Xunzi’s ideas such as ‘speaking with benevolence’, ‘listening with a learning mind’, and ‘arguing with justice’ still hold positive value for modern society.

Transport speed serves as a crucial indicator for evaluating transportation efficiency. During the Song Dynasty, which faced frequent external threats, the velocity of military supply transportation held particular significance. The Song government prioritized transport efficiency by comprehensively overhauling official labor teams, optimizing delivery routes, and instituting speed regulations accompanied by corresponding reward-punishment mechanisms. Although the transport speed standards established by the Tang and Song governments were lower than those in the Western Han Dynasty, the actual recorded speeds for cart-transported military supplies not only strongly exceeded minimum requirements but also surpassed the benchmarks set during the Western Han period. During wartime or in border defense areas in peacetime, transporting military supplies remained the most arduous and perilous labor duty for the common people, with the labor and cost involved far exceeding those required for agricultural production. The Song Dynasty failed to establish an efficient military logistics system, rendering transportation a critical bottleneck that constrained military operations. This predicament stemmed not from technological limitations but rather from systemic deficiencies in power mechanisms and management coordination, revealing institutional constraints within traditional Song logistical systems under wartime pressures.

After the failure of Wu Mingche’s Northern Expedition in the 10^th year of Taijian era (578), Emperor Xuan of Chen implemented a reform of the power operation mechanism to cope with internal and external crises. This led to the reconstruction of a new decision-making pattern involving both seigniors and ministers. Chen Shuling was entrusted with significant responsibilities due to his extensive experience in governing local states and counties. He held positions such as the Governor of Yangzhou and the Grand Commander, deeply involving himself in court politics by controlling both the ministry of government affairs and military forces. Emperor Xuan attempted to balance the bureaucratic group by involving the royal family in politics. Nevertheless, his excessive reliance on Chen Shuling eventually led to an imbalance in the power structure. After Emperor Xuan’s death in the 14^th year of the Taijian era (582), Chen Shuling launched a coup when his assassination attempt on the crown prince Chen Shubao failed. This demonstrates the risk of losing control of seigniors due to reform. The Chen Shuling Incident was not only a direct consequence of Emperor Xuan’s reform, but also marked a turning point from decline to downfall of the Chen Dynasty. This incident reflects the internal relationship between the reconstruction of the power operation mechanism and the collapse of the dynasty in the late Southern Dynasties.

As the prevailing type of poetry in the Yuan Dynasty, “sanqu” was not only the product of historical evolution from “shi” and “ci”, but also an aesthetic crystallization formed in the intellectual circle consisting of multi-ethnic groups at that time. It embodies an artistic fusion of multi-languages, multi-cultures and varied interests, all expressed in the Chinese language. It reflects the features of the new concept of “tianxia” (Under Heaven) that encompasses multiple peoples, including Mongolian, individuals with different colored eyes, Han people and ethnic groups in the south. The characteristics of sanqu are as follows: firstly, it is a free and flexible form of aesthetics which integrates multiple elements with a newfound “vulgar” taste and contemporary features; secondly, it embodies the straightforward joy of interaction and integration of multiple ethnic groups under the new concept of “tianxia”; thirdly, it expresses the Chinese aesthetic spirit as the core of the times, reflected in the pursuit of unity among diverse ethnicities and the celebration of diversity.

Chinese traditional aesthetics is rooted in ritual and music culture, which makes Chinese aesthetics manifest itself as the aesthetics of embodying the Dao, the aesthetics of literati, and the aesthetics of cultivation. The Dao is the interpretation and development of the ritual and music culture, and literati are intellectuals born from the social situation of the collapse of the ritual and music, and the cultivation of one’s character is essential to the ritual and music culture. The aesthetics of embodying the Dao is different from the aesthetics of knowledge in the West. Western aesthetics focuses on understanding/cognition, whereas Chinese aesthetics emphasizes experience/sensation. The aesthetics of embodying the Dao is mainly manifested in the “writings as the vehicle of the Dao” in Confucianism and the “unity of the Dao and art” in Daoism. Literati “aspire to the Dao” and use the Dao to fight against “power”, thus demonstrating the spirit and strength of character of literati. The aesthetics of literati differs from the Western aesthetics of the elites, embodying the spirit of literati and revealing their strength of character. Chinese aesthetics places special emphasis on “taste”, which is probably due to the implicit influence of the spirit of literati. The strong cultivation tradition among Chinese literati has also made Chinese traditional aesthetics synonymous with the aesthetics of cultivation. The concepts of “jingjie (realm) and gongfu (effort)” in the philosophy of cultivation are also core concepts in traditional Chinese aesthetics. Cultivating oneself before practicing art is the basic spirit of Chinese aesthetics. The aesthetics of embodying the Dao, the aesthetics of literati, and the aesthetics of cultivation are integrated into one cohesive whole. Nevertheless, if we have to make a distinction, then we might say that the first one demands sudden enlightenment and highlights jingjie, the second one emphasizes the strength of character, style and taste, and the third one relies on the effort to cultivate qi (vital energy). Enlightenment, jingjie, strength of character, style, taste, effort and qi – all of these have constituted the key terms of traditional Chinese aesthetics.

Ouyang Xiu advocated for the “Baizhan Style”, a poetic style that prohibits the use of common concrete imagery, with the intention of eliminating poetic flaws and establishing a new poetic trend. Mei Yaochen regarded Ouyang Xiu’s initiation of the “Baizhan Style” as merely a word game. Nevertheless, he actively employed the techniques of this style in his poems about rain and snow. Mei focused on the present and pursued the coexistence of the new and the old, that is to say, he sought innovation without discarding the old by actively absorbing and transforming literary heritage. In contrast, Ouyang Xiu and Su Shi valued competition. They selectively embraced the “past” and actively “bringing forth the new through the old”, thereby creating the future in the present. These represent two mechanisms for the evolution and development of Song Dynasty poetics. Influenced by this, Mei Yaochen’s poetic style was primarily characterized by “leisurely simplicity and plainness”, which in his later years tended toward the “peculiar”. Mei’s “leisurely simplicity and plainness” differed from Su Shi’s “plainness”, and his “peculiar” also diverged from the “splendid beauty” pursued by Ouyang Xiu and Su Shi.

This paper examines the dependence of countries’ exports on upstream products and downstream markets from a global perspective, constructing a value chain control index to thoroughly explore the theoretical foundations of how regional trade agreement (RTA) networks influence this index. Based on an empirical analysis framework and theoretical hypotheses, this paper utilizes country-level data from 2006 to 2018 to empirically test the impact of China and the United States’ RTA networks on value chain control. The results reveal that China’s external RTA networks primarily affect value chain control through intermediary positioning, whereas their influence in terms of breadth status, provision depth, and provision integration is weaker than U.S. networks. Furthermore, the mechanism analysis demonstrates that U.S. networks more effectively enhance value chain control through trade cost reduction and technology spillover mechanisms relative to China’s external RTA networks. The research provides inspiration for China’s RTA strategy: China should take the initiative to align high-standard international economic rules and improve the status of its network, leading and integrating the RTA network with “Chinese rules”. At the same time, the industry orientation of regional trade agreements should be strengthened to provide a stable, transparent, and predictable institutional environment for the mechanism.

The saying “hearing is unreliable, seeing is believing” reflects the fact that the movement of natural persons (Mode 4 of trade in services) serves as a crucial channel for information flow in goods trade. Due to the incomplete information inherent in goods trade contracts, importing countries must dispatch personnel to exporting countries for “in-process and post-delivery” inspections. This drives demand for service trade in the form of the movement of natural persons. Drawing on data for international natural person flows in China from 2010 to 2016, this paper examines the impact of goods exports on the movement of natural persons. Empirical results indicate that a 10% increase in exports of differentiated products leads to an additional 88,000 inbound travelers, equivalent to about 1,500 more Boeing 777 passenger flights. The findings suggest that if geopolitical factors keep natural person flows at a persistently low level, industries reliant on information input may trend toward “localization”, “shortening of supply chains” and “clustering”.

China and Japan primarily adopt a “business-to-business” (B2B) model for infrastructure cooperation in the third-party market in Southeast Asia. This long-standing model, which predates the “government-to-government” (G2G) approach, has primarily focused on sub-sectors such as energy and takes on various forms. However, this model faces several challenges. Firstly, Japanese private enterprises prioritize economic rationality, whereas Chinese state-owned enterprises partly undertake national geopolitical objectives, leading to difficulties in aligning goals. Secondly, China tends to engage in bilateral cooperation with individual Southeast Asian countries, whereas Japan prefers regional-level cooperation with ASEAN as a bloc, resulting in misaligned cooperation levels. Finally, differences in standards, especially in sectors such as transportation, further complicate cooperation. These challenges significantly hinder the progress of China-Japan cooperation in Southeast Asia, leading to delays, terminations, or the absence of cooperation in some projects. To address these challenges, China and Japan should appropriately increase the G2G component while deepening strategic B2B cooperation. Additionally, China should remain vigilant about Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia and the comparative advantages of Japanese financial enterprises’, carefully managing competition throughout the cooperation process.