Abstract:

Xunzi’s theory of argumentation is characterized by a focus on “discourse”. For instance, he advocates for “speaking with benevolence” and “keeping silent when one has doubts” in the context of “saying”. Meanwhile, in the realm of “arguing”, he emphasizes the need to “argue with sufficient reasons” and “argue with justice”. In general, he asserts that argumentation should adhere to three fundamental ethical principles: first, it should prioritize the overall interests of human society as its core value and starting point; second, the subject should be open to others and respect the equal rights and interests of all participants in the argument; third, the views of all parties should be genuinely recognized from the heart and not influenced by any external forces. However, when viewed through the lens of Habermas’s ‘discourse ethics’, Xunzi’s conception of discourse still has some shortcomings. These include his negative attitude towards discourse, presupposing outcomes and then attempting to reach consensus through discourse, disapproval of multiple values, failure to treat all speech and everyone’s right to discourse equally, and a lack of discussion on the nature of speech itself. However, if his position on value prioritization is set aside, Xunzi’s ideas such as ‘speaking with benevolence’, ‘listening with a learning mind’, and ‘arguing with justice’ still hold positive value for modern society.

Key words: Xunzi, argumentation, Habermas, “discourse”