学界关于儒学与权利的关系有相容论与不相容论两种观点，不相容论则由"儒家配不上权利"论逐渐走向"权利配不上儒家"论。不相容论者要么否定权利，要么否定儒学，但二者大都持"权利"起源特殊论和历史主义方法论，认为不能用"权利"话语来诠释儒学乃至西方古典世界。经由考察"权利"概念起源的两种不同理解尤其是人类学的理解，以及从概念分析厘定"权利"概念之要旨与分类的基础上，运用权利思想与话语对古典儒学的相关思想进行重构，可以有效地阐释儒家思想中的权利观念，有力地回应不相容论者的主要论据，并推进相容论者的观点。儒家思想的权利重构将有益于儒学与权利双方的发展，并为权利的合理性和可欲性做出辩护。

Pertaining to the relationship between Confucianism and rights, there are two opponent views in the academic circle:One holds that they are compatible, while the other insists that they are incompatible. The latter gradually shifts their viewpoint from "Confucianism does not deserve rights" to "rights do not deserve Confucianism". Those who hold that Confucianism and rights are incompatible deny either rights or Confucianism. In spite of this difference, they insist the special origin of "rights" and adopt a historicist methodology, believing that the discourse on "rights" cannot be applied to interpret Confucianism and even the ancient Western world. By analyzing the gist of the concept of "right" and the classification of rights and examining two different understandings of the origin of the concept of "right", especially anthropologic understanding, this paper reconstructs relative ideas in classic Confucianism with the discourse on rights so as to effectively interpret the Confucian idea of "right", convincingly respond to the arguments of those who hold that Confucianism and rights are incompatible and hence develop the doctrine that Confucianism and rights are compatible. This reconstruction of rights in Confucianism will benefit to the developments of both Confucianism and rights and defend the rationality and desirability of rights.