由于在出口信用保险业务中政府和出口商之间在某些产品如体验性产品上存在信息不对称, 出口国政府无法准确鉴别出口产品的真实质量。当政府通过出口信用机构提供的保险承保比例超过一定的合理程度时, 会使出口商欺瞒产品质量的道德风险增大, 从而妨碍了出口信用保险促进贸易的作用发挥。因此, 出口信用保险的承保比例应根据产品的质量特征设定一个合理的比例, 而不是越高越好。

To protect exporters from the risk of importers' payment default, the export credit agency usually supported or owned by the domestic government offers a service, which is called export credit in-surance (ECI). Because of the existence of asymmetric information, we see an inability of the exporter's government to verify the actual quality of products, which will limit its ability to encourage trade through ECI once the coverage provided goes be yond a certain threshold. This result provides a ra-tionale behind the limited coverage on ECI.