关键词: 道德能力之知, 道德动力之知, 有心无力之人, 判断力

Abstract: There is a debate on WANG Yang-ming's notion of liangzhi between YU Zhen-hua and HUANG Yong. YU believes that liangzhi is moral knowing-how while HUANG considers that it is moral knowing-to. HUANG criticizes that YU's misusing of the concept of disposition,which can be traced back to G. Ryle,has led to the wrong classification of liangzhi. To respond to HUANG's critiques,we must analyze the phenomenon of a person with moral knowing-to but no knowing-how. Then the examination on cases of a good hand of planting rice and a filial son shows HUANG's misusing of the concept of fancier. The revelation of the dimension of judgment in the conflicting structure of knowing-to,namely the capacity to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil,shows that knowing-how is a not sufficient for moral knowing-how although it is necessary. Furthermore,this paper defines moral knowing-how in terms of exclusiveness.

Key words: moral knowing-how, moral knowing-to, a person with moral knowing-to but no knowing-how, judgment