美西方主导下的附条件主权贷款：批判与反思

doi:10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2025.06.015

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在美西方国家的主导下，主权贷款的国际实践长期以附带改革条件的“附条件主权贷款”模式呈现，成为输出西式制度范式、嵌入性影响债务国治理结构的重要工具。这一模式在“法律与发展”运动以及新自由主义理论等支撑下，通过贷款条件强制推动债务国实施制度改革，在实践层面形成了具有外部约束效力的“准法律秩序”。然而，长期实践表明，附条件主权贷款不仅未有效提升债务国偿债能力，反而加剧了其制度依赖、治理弱化与主权侵蚀等深层问题；债务国的发展权与政策自主性受到结构性限制，全球债务治理的不公正与失衡愈加凸显。可见，当今世界十分有必要构建一个更具包容性与发展导向的新型主权贷款模式。有鉴于此，中国应立足主权平等与发展自主原则，推动构建以能力建设为核心、以软法为路径、以程序正义为保障的主权贷款新范式，并以“不附加政治条件”的贷款实践为基础，提供更具包容性与可持续性的国际法重构方案，为全球金融治理贡献中国智慧与制度样本。

关键词: 主权贷款, 附条件主权贷款, “法律与发展”运动, 全球治理

Abstract:

Under the dominance of the United States and other Western countries, the international practice of sovereign lending has long taken the form of conditional sovereign lending— loans tied to reform conditionality— which has operated as a key instrument for exporting Western institutional paradigms and embedding influence in the governance structures of debtor states. Grounded in the Law and Development Movement and neoliberalist theory, this model employs lending conditionality to compel institutional reforms in debtor states, thereby generating in practice a quasi-legal order with externally constraining effect. Long-standing experience, however, shows that conditional sovereign lending has not effectively strengthened debtor states’ debt-servicing capacity; to the contrary, it has deepened structural problems such as institutional dependency, governance weakening, and erosion of sovereignty. Debtor states’ right to development and policy autonomy are subject to structural constraints, and the injustice and imbalance of global debt governance have become increasingly salient. Therefore, it is necessary to build a new model of sovereign lending that is more inclusive and development-oriented. In this regard, China should, consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and developmental autonomy, promote a new paradigm of sovereign lending centered on capacity-building, using soft law as the principal modality and procedural justice as the safeguard; drawing on loan practices that do not attach political conditions, China can offer a more inclusive and sustainable proposal for the reconstruction of international law and contribute Chinese insights and institutional models to global financial governance.

Key words: sovereign lending, conditional sovereign lending, Law and Development Movement, global governance

李况然, 朱秋. 美西方主导下的附条件主权贷款：批判与反思[J]. 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2025, 57(6): 180-195.

Kuang-ran Li, Qiu Zhu. The Conditional Sovereign Lending Model under Western Dominance：Critique and Reflection[J]. J. East China Norm. Univ. Philos. Soc. Sci, 2025, 57(6): 180-195.

图/表 1

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	具体国家	投票权（%）
G7	美国、加拿大、英国、法国、德国、意大利、日本	16.49、2.22、4.03、4.03、 5.31、3.02、6.14
G7	合计	41.23
金砖国家	中国、巴西、俄罗斯、印度、南非、沙特阿拉伯、埃及、阿联酋、伊朗、埃塞俄比亚、印度尼西亚	6.08、2.22、2.59、2.63、0.63、2.01、0.43、0.49、0.74、0.09、0.95
金砖国家	合计	18.86