压力会转化为动力吗?——同业参照落差、CEO外部压力与会计信息质量之关系研究

doi:10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2018.03.012

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

从行为经济学的理论分析视角出发，以代理理论和认知评价理论为基础，基于中国上市公司2008—2015年的样本，实证研究同业参照落差、CEO外部压力与会计信息质量三者之间的关系，其结果表明：（1）CEO同业参照落差越大，会计信息质量越低。（2）CEO面临的外部债务压力会强化同业参照落差与会计信息质量之间的关系，产生"挤出效应"；CEO面临的分析师压力会抑制CEO同业参照落差与会计信息质量之间的关系，具有"治理效应"。在考虑内生性问题后，以上研究结论依然成立。进一步研究发现：CEO外部压力对同业参照落差与会计信息质量之间关系的"挤出效应"在国有企业和短期债务样本中更为显著。

关键词: 同业参照落差, CEO外部压力, 会计信息质量, 治理效应, 挤出效应

Abstract:

From the perspective of behavioral economic theory, this paper takes agency theory and cognitive evaluation theory as the basis, selects the data of China's listed companies for 2008-2015 years as the sample, and empirically studies the relationship among the peer reference gap, CEO external pressure and the quality of accounting information. The results show that:(1) the greater peer reference gap of CEO, the lower the quality of accounting information; (2) the pressure of external debt will strengthen the relationship between the peer reference gap and the quality of accounting information, which has the crowding-out effect; the pressure of analyst coverage will inhibit it, which has the governance effect. After considering endogenous problems, the above conclusions are still true. Further studies have found that the crowding-out effect of CEO external pressure on the relationship between the reference gap and the quality of accounting information is more significant in the state-owned enterprises and the short-term debt samples.

Key words: peer reference gap, external pressure of CEO, accounting information quality, governance effect, crowding out effect

罗昆, 桑朝阳. 压力会转化为动力吗?——同业参照落差、CEO外部压力与会计信息质量之关系研究[J]. 华东师范大学(哲学社会科学版), 2018, 50(3): 126-138.

LUO Kun, SANG Zhao-yang. Will Stress Be Changed into Motivation?: Peer Reference Gap, CEO External Pressure and Accounting Information Quality[J]. Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph, 2018, 50(3): 126-138.

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