华东师范大学(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2012, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (3): 53-61.

• 管理问题探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究：基于盈余管理的视角

杨蓉   

  1. 华东师范大学商学院， 上海， 200241
  • 出版日期:2012-06-01 发布日期:2012-09-01
  • 通讯作者: 杨蓉
  • 作者简介:杨蓉
  • 基金资助:

    本文为国家社科基金项目（09BJY031）的阶段性研究成果

On Executive Compensation of Listed Companies of Monopolistic Industries: From the Perspective of Earning Management

YANG Rong   

  • Online:2012-06-01 Published:2012-09-01
  • Contact: YANG Rong
  • About author: YANG Rong

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摘要： 我国国企尤其是垄断行业国企高管薪酬问题近年来已成为公众关注的焦点。尽管已有研究肯定了管理层权力与高管薪酬之间以及高管薪酬与盈余管理之间存在着相关关系，但并没有探讨高管控制权对盈余管理的影响。事实上，造成我国国有垄断企业盈余管理的重要原因是国有所有者缺位，而高管却拥有相当的控制权。通过选择2002—2009年14个代表性垄断行业178家A股上市公司的873个样本作为研究对象的实证研究发现，在我国垄断行业上市公司中，高管控制权与高管薪酬显著正相关；高管利用自身权力，通过盈余管理实现自身利益最大化。

关键词: 垄断行业企业, 高管控制权, 高管薪酬, 盈余管理

Abstract: Excessive executive compensation in stateowned listed companies, especially in monopolistic industries, has recently attracted more public attention than ever. Much domestic and international literature indicates a correlation between managerial power and executive compensation and also between executive compensation and earning management. However, research on the correlation between managerial power and earning management continues to be scarce. In fact, it is mainly due to the absence of owner and managerial power that earning management is dominant in the stateowned companies of monopolistic industries. Exploring 873 samples of 178 listed companies of 14 monopolistic industries during 20022009, this paper argues that there is a positive correlation between managerial power and executive compensation in monopolistic industries in China. Executives utilize their power to maximize their own interests in earning management.