华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) >

2007 , Vol. 39 >Issue 3: 9 - 13

DOI: https://doi.org/10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2007.03.002

世界史研究

中苏同盟形成与破裂过程中的美国因素

  • 刘军
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  • 华东师范大学 国际关系与地区发展研究院, 上海 200062
刘军(1970—), 男, 湖北蕲春人, 华东师范大学国际关系与地区发展研究院俄罗斯研究中心副教授, 博士

收稿日期: 2006-11-22

  网络出版日期: 2007-05-25

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The American Roles during the Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

  • Jun LIU
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  • School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China

Received date: 2006-11-22

  Online published: 2007-05-25

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摘要

从影响中苏同盟形成与破裂的诸多外部因素来看, 美国扮演着共同威胁者、楔子驱动者以及平衡实施者的角色。但是, 在中苏同盟形成初期, 中苏双方并不认为来自美国的威胁是一种迫在眉睫的重大威胁, 只是到朝鲜战争之后, 相互之间的敌意形象才正式得以确立。美国的“楔子战略”对中苏同盟的瓦解有一定的消极影响, 但从根本上看, 是中苏之间关于对美观念与政策的分歧才导致矛盾的产生。中苏同盟瓦解后, 随着中美之间的相互接近, 中美之间并没有形成一种心照不宣的盟友关系, 美国只是在中苏之间保持平衡并寻求有利于自身的战略态势。

关键词： 中苏同盟; 美国因素; 共同威胁; 楔子驱动; 战略平衡

本文引用格式

刘军 . 中苏同盟形成与破裂过程中的美国因素[J]. 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2007 , 39(3) : 9 -13 . DOI: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2007.03.002

Abstract

Generally speaking, there were three main roles to be played by the United States during the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance: common threat, wedge driver, and balance keeper.As to the common threat, the threat from the U.S.was exaggerated.Neither China nor USSR had regarded the U.S.as a direct and imminent threat before the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance.As a wedge driver, America's role was very limited.The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance was not consistent with the American government's wedge strategy.It was China's and USSR's different ideas and policies towards the U.S.that caused the collapse of their alliance.As a balance keeper, Nixon Administration simultaneously improved relations with both China and USSR.The so-called "China card" and "tacit ally" was exaggerated.

Key words： Sino-Soviet Alliance; American role; common threat; wedge driver; balance keeper

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