Due to “capitalist” endowment, actual controllers often make corporate control structure sophisticated with the intent to raise capital leverage, relief information disclosure pressure, establish platform for related transaction and satisfy the requirement for IPOs in China’s securities market. Via the empirical research on the A shares of private-owned listed companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, this paper finds that the younger and better educated the corporate actual controllers are, the higher their “capitalist” endowment would be, and this is especially true for controllers who own the business and management education background. However, special political identity will make actual controllers more cautious in exerting “capitalist” endowment and avoid intricate structure design of control right.
蓝Fa-Qin
,
ZHENG Wei
,
SONG Ju-Sheng
. Design of Corporate Control, “Capitalist” Endowment and Entrepreneur Background[J]. Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2016
, 48(1)
: 137
-145
.
DOI: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.016