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Spatio-temporal Dynamics and Influencing Factors of National City Glory Lists:From the Perspective of Multi-honor Joint Creation

  • Cheng-dong YI ,
  • Tian-yu BI ,
  • Zhi-ji HUANG ,
  • Zheng-de FAN
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Accepted date: 2021-12-10

  Online published: 2022-01-22

Abstract

The city-based awarding and commendation projects designed and implemented by the central government (National City Glory Lists) have played an important role in promoting urban non-economic development. This paper analyses the spatio-temporal dynamics of the number of times on-the-list cities and the influencing factors from the perspective of Multi-honor Joint Creation by using four typical projects as National Civilized City, National Garden City, National Sanitary City and National Model City for Environmental Protection. It finds out that the number of the cities on the list has been increasing year by year, and Multi-honor Joint Creation cases gradually becomes dominative. The number of cities on the list reveals the spatial pattern of more in the east and less in the west, and gradually extends to the central and western parts of the country. The frequency of cities on the list has been significantly characterized by spatial agglomeration, this trend is increasing year by year and the hotspot pattern is hot in the east and cold in the west. The process and evaluation system of the National City Glory Lists share many common features, resulting in the similarity of stimulating signals, mechanisms and motivation of participants. In this way, cities can obtain a diminishing marginal cost effect for Multi-honor Joint Creation. The factors that influence the ability to become a city on the list are political mobilization ability, financial and economic strength, and the ability to build urban infrastructure and provide public services. There is indeed an asymmetric promotion effect between different projects. Finally, in order to optimize the mechanism of the National City Glory Lists and improve the performance of urban governance, we shall improve evaluation methods, strengthen review work, optimize evaluation indicators, and innovate projects based on new development concepts.

Cite this article

Cheng-dong YI , Tian-yu BI , Zhi-ji HUANG , Zheng-de FAN . Spatio-temporal Dynamics and Influencing Factors of National City Glory Lists:From the Perspective of Multi-honor Joint Creation[J]. Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2022 , 54(1) : 155 -171 . DOI: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2022.01.014

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