Content of 公司治理研究 in our journal

Published in last 1 year |  In last 2 years |  In last 3 years |  All Please wait a minute... For Selected: Download Citations EndNote Reference Manager ProCite BibTeX RefWorks Toggle Thumbnails Select Design of Corporate Control, “Capitalist” Endowment and Entrepreneur Background LAN Fa-Qin,ZHENG Wei,SONG Ju-Sheng Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2016, 48 (1): 137-145.   DOI: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.016 Abstract （373）   HTML （3）    PDF （1617KB）（906）       Knowledge map    Due to “capitalist” endowment, actual controllers often make corporate control structure sophisticated with the intent to raise capital leverage, relief information disclosure pressure, establish platform for related transaction and satisfy the requirement for IPOs in China’s securities market. Via the empirical research on the A shares of private-owned listed companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, this paper finds that the younger and better educated the corporate actual controllers are, the higher their “capitalist” endowment would be, and this is especially true for controllers who own the business and management education background. However, special political identity will make actual controllers more cautious in exerting “capitalist” endowment and avoid intricate structure design of control right. Related Articles | Metrics Select “Eight Provisions”, Executive Control and the Perks YANG Rong Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2016, 48 (1): 146-157.   DOI: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.017 Abstract （426）   HTML （3）    PDF （1933KB）（985）       Knowledge map    In recent years, excessive perks in state-owned companies have aroused widespread concern. Taking the A-share state-owned companies listed from year 2010 to 2014 as samples, this paper empirically verifies that the “Eight Provisions” restrains the perks by executive control. It restrains not only the total perks but also the unusual perks. The “Eight Provisions” have more power in restraining the perks in lower executive control companies and listed central state-owned corporations. Therefore, to maximize the deterrent effect of the “Eight Provisions” on the perks, it is necessary to implement the “Eight Provisions” further in listed central state-owned corporations. Related Articles | Metrics Select Competition in Product Market, Internal Pay Gap and Company Performance HAO Dong-Yang Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2016, 48 (1): 158-168.   DOI: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.018 Abstract （393）   HTML （3）    PDF （1770KB）（740）       Knowledge map    Some exploratory research has been made on the relation between internal pay gap and company performance, yet there is no deep analysis on whether the relation varies with market circumstance. Based on institution background in China, this paper focuses on the relation between internal pay gap and company performance in the condition of different product market competition. The result shows that the relation forms an inverted U shape, and the turning point of the U shape moves to the right when the competition in product market gets more intense, which means that the best level of company’s internal pay gap will be higher when the competition in product market is more intense. This tells us that relevant government departments shall consider industry difference when controlling the internal pay gap to promote income equality. It is suitable to take advantage of bigger internal pay gap in the industries or companies of more intense competition so as to make internal pay gap fully play an incentive role. Related Articles | Metrics Select Empirical Test on Financial Listed Companies’ Executive Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity: Based on Performance Index PFMI SUN Li,YANG Li-Ping Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2016, 48 (1): 169-179.   DOI: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.019 Abstract （338）   HTML （3）    PDF （1898KB）（1238）       Knowledge map    The high pay of the executives in financial companies has attracted the attention of the government and society. Since the financial sector plays an important role in the macro-economy, the government unveiled a series of compensation management and performance evaluation regulations. Considering the particular operation mode of the four different financial sub-sectors, that is, banking, insurance, securities and trust, this paper designs performance proxy variables PFMI according to the “financial performance evaluation standards”, and takes mixed regression and panel data regression approaches to study executive pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 42 financial companies listed on A-Share. This is quite different from most current studies, in which only one single financial performance indicator has been used. By comparing the sub-sectors of the financial industry, this paper shows that the listed banks’ executive pay has a positive correlation with bank performance and the executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher than other financial sectors while the pay-for-performance sensitivity of insurance takes the second place. Also, there is no significant correlation between the executive pay and the operation performance for securities and trust. These findings will have some empirical reference value for further improvement of financial institutions remuneration management. Related Articles | Metrics Select External governance environment, Financial leverage and Over-investment ——based on the Shenzhen stock exchange listed companies Yang Rong, Lu Lina Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2014, 46 (4): 116-126.   Abstract （446）   HTML （5）    PDF （1681KB）（1038）       Knowledge map    Research on the relationship between financial leverage and over-investment, as well as how external governance environment influences the effect which the financial leverage exerts on over-investment has important theoretical and practical significance. In this research, 2251 observation samples in the year 2008 to 2011 from the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange are selected, for analyzing the relationship among external governance environment, financial leverage and over-investment. Through the empirical research, we find that financial leverage has inhibitory effect on over-investment. And there is a negative correlation between over-investment and local product market competition, information disclosure quality, local degree of marketization, while a positive correlation between over-investment and local government intervention. Related Articles | Metrics Select Analysis of management earnings forecast Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2014, 46 (4): 127-137.   Abstract （439）   HTML （6）    PDF （1717KB）（1243）       Knowledge map    : This paper investigates the effects of internal and external governance mechanism on annual earnings preannouncement and its characteristics. Using analyst number following to measure the entity’s supervision from outside, and ownership nature, equity restriction degree and earnings management to measure internal efficiency of governance, empirical results show that analyst following promotes the disclosure of annual earnings preannouncement, thus increasing information transparency. The less analyst following is, the later annual earnings preannouncement is disclosed and the more bad news presents. Relative to SOEs, non-SOEs prefer to preannounce yearly earnings, but the precision is lower and good news is predominant. The higher the degree of equity restriction among top five shareholders, the less annual earnings preannouncement is, but when it is disclosed, precision is higher and date is later. We also find that the behavior of annual earnings preannouncement does have continuity. In general, effective external supervision and internal governance mechanism do influence annual earnings preannouncement and its characteristics. Related Articles | Metrics Select The Research on the Act of Embezzlement of Controlling Shareholders of Listed Companies in China under Complete Circulation LAN Fa-qin, LI Yong-mei & CHEN Xiao-peng Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2013, 45 (6): 116-122.   Abstract （620）   HTML （10）    PDF （466KB）（1183）       Knowledge map    Based on the controlling shareholders decision model of the existing literatures, this paper constructs a three-stage model of controlling shareholders’ utility maximization to analyze the influence factors of the controlling shareholders’ tunneling, unloading and sustaining behaviors. Empirical studies show that the unloading behavior of controlling shareholders is primary determined by the controlling shareholders’ original shareholding ratio, injection or share repurchase ratio, private benefits multiplier of the controlling stake, and the external legal environment. Considering the embezzlement of the controlling shareholder under complete circulation and its principal causes, external legal system, information disclosure, corporate governance are all aspects that deserve much attention to protect the interests of the market participants, especially individual investors. Related Articles | Metrics Select The Ownership Nature and the Pay-performance Stickiness of Senior Executives SUN Li & YANG Li-ping Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph    2013, 45 (6): 123-131.   Abstract （674）   HTML （10）    PDF （535KB）（1440）       Knowledge map    The executive compensation of listed companies is characterized by secret stickiness, that is, the increase of salaries accompanied with the growth of operating performance is significantly higher than the decrease of salaries caused by the dropping of companies’ performance. This paper uses statistical regression method to analyze the data of 2475 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market. By comparing the pay-performance stickiness of listed companies with different forms of ownership, this paper demonstrates that the pay-performance stickiness of state-owned companies is significantly stronger than that of private-owned companies. This study offers reference for further optimization for executives’ performance appraisal system in state-owned companies. Related Articles | Metrics