华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2003, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (4): 47-51, 57.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2003.04.008

• 哲学  法政 • 上一篇    下一篇

朱谦之“唯情哲学”批判

方用   

  • 收稿日期:2002-10-09 出版日期:2003-07-01 发布日期:2003-04-25
  • 作者简介:方用(1971- ), 女, 安徽歙县人, 同济大学文法学院讲师

A Critique of Zhu Qianzhi's Emotionalism

Yong FANG   

  • Received:2002-10-09 Online:2003-07-01 Published:2003-04-25

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摘要：

朱谦之的唯情哲学在中国近代哲学中独树一帜, 它以非理性的“情”作为宇宙、人生的本体, 以与情合一的直觉作为哲学的根本方法, 并通过“性情”之辩提出了情善说, 论证了情这一非理性要素在伦理价值中的正面意义。这些思想不仅对于唯理性哲学具有纠偏作用, 而且对于全面地理解个体生命, 对于哲学的健全的发展, 都具有一定的启发作用。

关键词: 朱谦之, 唯情主义, 情善说

Abstract:

Zhu Qianzhi developed a philosophical thought of his own in modern Chinese philosophy, that is, emotionalism. He took irrational emotion as noumenon of our universe and life, and regarded intuition in harmony with emotion as an essential philosophical method. Through his discussions on the relationship between nature and emotion, he put forward his doctrine of good emotion, arguing that emotion, as an irrational element, had a positive significance in ethical values. These ideas play an important role not only in rectifying rational philosophy but also in a comprehensive understanding of individual life.

Key words: Zhu Qianzhi, emotionalism, doctrine of good emotion

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