华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2021, Vol. 53 ›› Issue (5): 18-29.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2021.05.003

• 哲学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

索萨的“完好之知”还不完好？——王阳明的良知与第三个柏拉图问题

黄勇   

  • 出版日期:2021-09-15 发布日期:2021-09-27
  • 作者简介:黄勇，香港中文大学哲学系教授（香港，999077）；华东师范大学哲学专业1977级校友
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金重大项目“伦理学知识体系的当代中国重建”（项目编号：19ZDA033）

A Third Platonic Problem for Sosa？Or How WANG Yang-ming Can Know Better than Full Well？

Yong HUANG   

  • Online:2021-09-15 Published:2021-09-27

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摘要：

索萨讨论了两个关于知识本性和知识价值的柏拉图问题，但知识不仅还涉及索萨所没有讨论的第三个柏拉图问题，而且离开了这第三个柏拉图问题，索萨所讨论的前两个柏拉图问题也不能得到真正的解决。这第三个柏拉图问题即知识的影响问题：一个人的知识是否具有内在驱动作用。由索萨所讲的认知能力所产生的完好适切的道德信念并不具有道德上的动力。为了解决第三个柏拉图问题，我们可以借鉴王阳明的良知说，考察良知的三个特性。在阳明看来，道德知识是一种引发人行动的动力之知。依此，索萨意义上的知者并不具有完好之知，因为他的知识并没有引发他做出相应的行动。

关键词: 索萨, 柏拉图, 王阳明, 良知, 动力之知, 完好之知

Abstract:

Ernest Sosa discusses the two Platonic problems involving the nature of knowledge and value of knowledge. However, not only does knowledge involve a third Platonic question that Sosa fails to pay attention to, but the two Platonic problems that Sosa does pay attention to cannot be adequately solved without the third Platonic problem being taken care of. The third Platonic problem involves the impact of knowledge: Whether a person knowing full well is motivated to act accordingly. The fully apt moral belief produced by the epistemic competence in Sosa is not morally motivating. To solve the third Platonic problem, we can solicit help from WANG Yang-ming’s doctrine of liangzhi, examining the three unique features. In Yangming, moral knowledge is a kind of knowing-to that inclines one to act. Thus, one who knows in Sosa’s sense cannot be said to know full well since he or she is not motivated to act according to his or her knowledge.

Key words: Ernest Sosa, Plato, WANG Yang-ming, liangzhi, knowing-to, knowing full well