华东师范大学(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2011, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (6): 116-122.

• 金融问题探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

危机冲击、汇率制度与货币政策协调研究

方显仓   

  1. 华东师范大学商学院， 上海， 200241
  • 出版日期:2011-11-15 发布日期:2011-11-29
  • 通讯作者: 方显仓
  • 作者简介:方显仓:华东师范大学商学院工商管理系副教授、经济学博士，研究方向：货币金融理论与政策、就业（失业）经济学、环境经济学、制度经济学、汇率理论与政策。

An Analysis of the Crisis Shock, Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy Coordination

FANG Xian-Cang   

  • Online:2011-11-15 Published:2011-11-29
  • Contact: FANG Xian-Cang
  • About author: FANG Xian-Cang

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摘要： 经济全球化和金融市场一体化的发展，需要各国货币政策和汇率政策的协调。通过对两国模型的浮动汇率下和固定汇率下古诺博弈和Stackelberg博弈的分析发现，当存在对称性危机冲击时，领头国货币供应减少量从小到大依次为：固定汇率下Stackelberg均衡、固定汇率下古诺均衡、浮动汇率下Stackelberg均衡、浮动汇率下古诺均衡。追随国货币供应减少量为：固定汇率下Stackelberg均衡小于浮动汇率下的结果，但固定汇率下古诺解中货币供应减少量更小。对称性冲击下追随国的损失在固定汇率下Stackelberg均衡时最小；领头国的损失在固定汇率下达到Stackelberg均衡时也最小，因此，合作博弈能增强抵御外部冲击的能力。面对金融危机的强烈负向冲击，各国应联合起来增加货币信贷供给，维持汇率的稳定甚至固定汇率。

关键词: Stackelberg博弈, 古诺博弈, 汇率制度, 货币政策协调, 危机冲击

Abstract: With the development of economic globalization and financial market integration, the economies in the world must attach importance to cooperation in the monetary policy and exchange rate policy. By building a two economy model, this paper analyzes respectively the Cournot game equilibrium and Stackelberg game equilibrium. At a time when a symmetrical crisis shock rises, the exchange rate regime will present a fixed or floating exchange rate. It is believed that the economies can enhance counteracting risk of adverse shocks through coordinating in policies, that is, countries in the world shall increase money supply and stabilize their exchange rates when facing adverse crisis shocks.