|
Binmore, Keneth, Amer Shaked and John Sutton (1985): "Testing Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study", American Economic Rivew, 75, 1178-1180.
|
|
Bowley, A. (1928): "Bilateral Monopoly", Economic Joumal, 38, 651-659.
|
|
Crott, H. W., G. F. Muller and P. L. Hamel (1978): "The Influence of the Aspiration Level, of the Level of Informaiton and Bargaining Expernience on the Process and Outcome in a Baraining situation". in H. Sauemann ed. : "Contibution to the Exoerimental Economics", Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
|
|
Edgeworth, F. Y (1881): "Mathematical Psychics", London: C. Kegan Paul & CO
|
|
Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowits, N. E. Savin and Martin Sefton (1998): "Replicability, Faimess and Pay in Experiments with Simple Bargaining Games", Working Paper, 88-30, Depertment of Econonics, University of lowa, forthcoming in Gane and Economic Behavior
|
|
Güth, Wemer and Reinhard Tietz (1988): "Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake: An Experinental Analysis", in R. Ti etz, W. Albers and R. Selten, eds. : "Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Gemes and Markets", Berling: Springer.
|
|
Güth, Wemer, Rolf Schmittberger and Bemd Schwarze (1982): "An Experimetal Analyais of Utimatumi Bargaining, " Joumal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.
|
|
Güth, W. and R. Tietz (1985): "Strategic Power Versus Distributive Justice: An Extpenimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining", in H. Brandstatter and E. Kirchle, eds. : "Economic Psychology", Linz, 129-137.
|
|
Güth, W. and R. Tietz (1986): "Auctioning U1timatum Bergaining Positions: How to Decide if Rational Decisions are Unac ceptable?" in R. Scholz, ed., Current lssues in West Geman Decision Research, Frankful, Bem, New York; 173-185.
|
|
Harrison, G. W. and Kevin A. McCabe (1988): "Testing Bargaining Theory in Experments", Department of Economics, Univernsity of Arizona, Discussinon Paper No. 88-10, forthcoming in M. Isaac, ed. : "Research in Experimental Economics", Vol. 5, Greenwich Conn: JAI Press.
|
|
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977): "Rational Behavior and Bargaining Exquilibrium", Cambridge: Cambrideg Univeraity Press.
|
|
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, K. Shachat and V. Smith (1991): "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Cames", draft, Department of Economics, University of Arizona
|
|
Kahneman, D., J, L. Knetsch and R. 'Thaler (1986): "Faimess as a Cnstraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Mar ket", American Econonic Review, 76. 728-741
|
|
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975): "Other Solutions to Nauh''s Bargaining Problem". Fxconometrica, 45, 513-518
|
|
Marshall, A. (1890): "Principles of Economics", 9th edn, with Annotatons by C. Ww. Cuillbaud, Lndon: Macmillan, 1961.
|
|
Nash, 1. F. (1950): "The Bargaining Problenm", Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
|
|
Nash, I. F. (1953): "Iwo Person Cooperative Games", Econometrica, 21, 128-140. Neelin, J. . Hugu Sonnenschein and Matthew Spiegel(1988): "A Further Test of Non-coopenative Bargaining Theory: Comment", American Econornic Review, 78, 824-836.
|
|
Nydegger, Rudy V. and H. G. Owen (1975): "Two Person Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms", Inter- national Joumal of Game Theory, 3, 239-249
|
|
Osbome, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1990): "Bargaining and Markets", San Diegu: Academic Press.
|
|
Raiffa, Howard (1953): "Arbitration Schenes for Generalized Two Person Canes", in H. W. Kuhnand and A. W. Tuck- er, eds. : "Contributions to the Theory of Games", Princeton: Princeton Uiniversity Press, 36I-387.
|
|
Rapoport, A., O Frenkel and Josef Pemer (1977): "Experiments with Couperative 2 x 2 Games", Theory and Decision, 8, 67-92.
|
|
Roth, Alvin, E, (1977): "Independence of Irrelevant Altematives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem", Joumal of E- conomic Theory, 16, 247-251.
|
|
Roth, Alvin. E. (1978): "The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining", Fconometrica, 46, 587 -594.
|
|
Roth, Alvin, E. (1979): "Axiomatic Models of Beargaining", Belin-Heiddelberg-New York: Springer.
|
|
Roth, Alvin, E. and Michael W. K. Malouf (1979): "Gane Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Beargaining", psychological Review, 86, 574-594.
|
|
Roth, Alvin, E. and J. Keith Mumighan (1982): "The Role of Infomation in Bargaining: An Experimental Study", Econo metrica, 50, 1123-1143.
|
|
Roth, Alvin, E., V. Prasnider, M. Okuno Fujiwara and S. Zanir (1991): "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsbungh and Tokyo: An Experimental Study", Anerican Fcononic Review, 81, 1068-1095
|
|
Rubinstein, A (1982): "Perfcet Exquilibrium in Bargaining Model", Econonetrica, 50, 97-109, Stahl, 1. (1972): "Bargaining Theory", Stockhlom: Economics Research Institute, Stuckholn Schonl of Economics
|
|
Spiegel, M. Janet Currie, Hugo Sonneschein and A. Sen (1990): "Firnst Mover Acvantage and the Division of Surplus in Two Person Altemaiting Offer Ganes: Results from Bargaining Exqperinents", W orking Paper, Columbia Business School
|
国家社会科学基金学术期刊资助入选期刊