Abstract: ZHANG Jing-wu, the Central Government representative in Lhasa, submitted a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 21, 1953. The telegram, which was prepared for the forthcoming negotiation on Sino-Indian relations in Tibet, not only provided the information about Indian privileges in Tibet, but suggested that priority of negotiation should be the issue of border disputes. The suggestion had not been adopted by the Central Government. China and India had no talks on their border issues in their negotiation on Tibet in 1954. China’s delay strategy with regard to border disputes was heavily shaped by the asymmetrical salience of bilateral relations. India’s unique role as the major channel between China and the West and China’s dependence on Indian export necessities to Tibet were the most relevant factors precluding Beijing from responding effectively to the Indian occupation of territories in the southern Himalayas. Such delay strategy has significant and complicated impacts on China’s settlement of its border disputes with neighboring countries.

Key words: ZHANG Jing-wu&rsquo, s Telegram, Indian privileges in Tibet, China-India Agreement in 1954, Sino-Indian board issues, &ldquo, delay strategy&rdquo