财务困境公司能够通过并购实现脱困吗？

doi:10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2022.05.015

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

并购重组是资源优化配置的重要实现方式。深入揭示并购在财务困境企业脱困中的作用，有助于为企业走出困境进而实现高质量发展提供可行路径。现有关于财务困境公司并购脱困的文献多将困境公司作为被收购方，而忽视了财务困境公司作为并购方实现脱困的问题。为弥补这一不足，选择2004—2015年面临财务困境的我国上市公司为样本，从另一角度考察财务困境公司并购的短期价值与长期绩效，其结果发现：财务困境公司主动并购既能够带来显著为正的短期市场价值，也能够带来公司长期绩效的改善；并购后，将通过降低公司冗余资源而提升困境公司的长期绩效，也将通过提高公司偿债能力而促进财务困境公司长期绩效改善。这为我国财务困境公司通过并购进行脱困提供了新的证据，尤其对受新冠肺炎疫情冲击而陷入财务困境公司的后续发展及政府相关支持政策的制定具有重要的启发意义。

关键词: 财务困境, 公司并购, 长期绩效, 短期市场价值

Abstract:

M&A is an important way to optimize the allocation of resources. A deep study of the important role of M&A in helping distressed companies get out of financial distress will help to offer a feasible path for companies to achieve high-quality development. The existing literatures on the M&A related to financial distressed companies mostly treat distressed companies as the targets, while ignoring financial distressed companies as acquirers in corporate M&A. To fill this gap, we investigate the short-term value and post-merger performance of distressed companies as acquirers over the period of 2004-2015. The results indicate that M&A of financial distressed companies can not only create positive short-term market value, but also improve the long-term performance of the companies. We further find that the long-term post-merger performance of distressed companies can be improved through reducing the financial slack, and through improving corporate debt payment ability. These results provide new evidence for China′s financial distress companies to get rid of financial distress through M&A, which has important enlightening significance.

Key words: financial distress, corporate M&A, long-term performance, short-term market value

李云鹤, 朱林染, 谭卓鸿, 钱张瑜. 财务困境公司能够通过并购实现脱困吗？[J]. 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2022, 54(5): 161-174.

Yun-he LI, Lin-ran ZHU, Zhuo-hong TAN, Zhang-yu QIAN. Can Distressed Companies Get out of Financial Distress through M&A？[J]. Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2022, 54(5): 161-174.

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变量名	观测样本	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Panel A：被解释变量：财务绩效
ΔROA	4 806	?0.001	0.095	?0.101	?0.005	0.645
ΔROE	4 806	?0.002	0.123	?0.521	?0.002	0.338
Panel B：解释变量：并购指标
MA	4 806	0.109	0.049	0	0	1
Panel C：控制变量
Asset	4 806	21.021	1.297	14.48	21.418	30.102
Cash	4 806	18.15	1.52	7.738	18.647	26.58
Reve	4 806	20.221	1.579	10.611	20.809	27.817
Tax	4 806	0.161	1.446	?88.295	0.155	26.817
EPS	4 806	0.23	0.605	?7.057	0.182	6.428
Leve	4 806	0.61	0.857	0.101	0.506	0.951
Opeca	4 806	19.742	1.126	11.953	19.802	24.583
Cashasset	4 806	0.15	0.191	?0.003	0.11	10.308
Panel D：中介机制
QR	4 806	?0.112	0.897	?1.307	?0.215	2.558
InterestCov	4 806	2.316	1.411	?1.481	1.986	3.393

事件窗口	CAAR	SD	T-value
[-1，1]	0.007*	0.051	1.695
[-2，2]	0.009*	0.068	1.864

	CAR
	[-1,1]		[-2,2]
Risk（25%）	0.013^*（1.717）	0.012^**（2.152）	0.015^*（1.758）	0.013^**（2.303）
Asset		?0.005^***（?2.894）		?0.006^***（?3.308）
Cash		?0.001（?0.923）		?0.001（?7.133）
Reve		?0.001（?0.567）		?0.002（?0.389）
Tax		?0.001（?1.258）		?0.001（?1.326）
EPS		0.251^***（7.435）		0.227^***（7.021）
Leve		?0.025（?1.533）		?0.031（?1.468）
Opeca		?0.002（?1.497）		?0.002（?1.328）
Cashasset		?0.016（?0.786）		?0.021（?0.891）
Constant	?0.076^***（?3.787）	0.620^***（5.211）	?0.079^***（?3.867）	0.613^***（5.336）

	ΔROA
	Risk(25%)		Z值≤1.8
MA	0.032^*(1.871)	0.023^***(5.526)	0.013^**(2.171)	0.013^***(3.141)
Asset		?0.027^***(?3.194)		?0.026^***(?3.264)
Cash		?0.004(?1.123)		?0.001(?0.085)
Reve		?0.002(?0.281)		?0.006(?1.124)
Tax		?0.001(?1.222)		?0.002^**(?2.218)
EPS		0.162^***(9.735)		0.154^***(9.350)
Leve		?0.028(?1.213)		?0.005(?0.716)
Opeca		?0.004(?1.592)		?0.003(?1.391)
Cashasset		?0.003(?0.216)		0.002(0.227)
Constant	?0.093^***(?2.678)	0.750^***(6.042)	?0.058^***(?3.299)	0.707^***(6.153)
N	4806	4806	5575	5575

	第一阶段				第二阶段
	ΔROA		QR		ΔROA		ΔROA
MA	0.032^* (1.871)	0.023^*** (5.526)	?0.463^*** (?20.936)	?0.379^*** (?10.205)			0.029^* (1.871)	0.020^*** (5.526)
QR					?0.035^* (?1.750)	?0.021^*** (?2.783)	?0.016^* (?1.790)	?0.013^* (?1.717)
Asset		?0.027^*** (?3.194)		?0.182^*** (?4.733)		?0.030^*** (?3.113)		?0.032^*** (?3.283)
Cash		?0.004 (?1.123)		?0.012 (?0.939)		?0.003 (?0.812)		?0.003 (?0.856)
Reve		?0.002 (?0.281)		0.040^* (1.786)		?0.003 (?0.501)		?0.001 (?0.148)
Tax		?0.001 (?1.222)		0.003 (0.594)		?0.002^** (?2.172)		?0.001 (?1.590)
EPS		0.162^*** (9.735)		0.164^*** (4.208)		0.160^*** (10.345)		0.162^*** (10.302)
Leve		?0.028 (?1.213)		?0.232^** (?2.536)		?0.030 (?1.267)		?0.030 (?1.501)
Opeca		?0.004 (?1.592)		0.094^*** (?4.296)		?0.001 (?0.282)		?0.002 (?0.585)
Cashasset		?0.003 (?0.216)		1.100 (1.400)		0.006 (0.513)		0.002 (0.337)
Constant	?0.093^*** (?2.867)	0.750^*** (6.042)	?0.385^*** (?4.987)	1.223^*** (5.015)	?0.077 (?1.162)	0.676^*** (6.071)	?0.083^*** (?2.667)	0.687^*** (6.448)