关键词: 同情, 休谟, 卢梭, 道德情感

Abstract:

In the discussion about how the self and others can coexist harmoniously, Hume and Rousseau provide two internally consistent and synergistic conceptions of sympathy. As typical modern theorists, their focus on sympathy and their common emphasis on moral sentiments reflect modern ethical life’s introspective exploration of humanity and morality and affirmation of everyday life. Starting from this common problem awareness, these two secular and equalized sympathy views emphasize the modern human’s ability to exert the power of moral emotions based on the natural construct of the mind, maintain the natural virtues of sympathy, and adhere to a universalism-inspired sympathetic attitude beyond positions and interests, focusing on the care of humankind. Furthermore, in terms of specific sympathy mechanism, Hume’s sympathy embodies “fellow-feeling” for all the feelings of pleasure and pain, praise and blame, while Rousseau’s sympathy embodies “putting oneself in the other’s shoes” in the face of others’ pain; the former underlines a dispassionate and compassionate observation of sorrow, while the latter emphasizes a passionate self-concerned action, which jointly leads to the issue of justice. Contemporary interpreters need to distinguish between the transformative implications of these two sympathy views and explore how to use sympathy to improve society.

Key words: sympathy, Hume, Rousseau, moral sentiments