华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2024, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (5): 22-30.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2024.05.003

• 重启科技与人文对话 • 上一篇    下一篇

道德共同体何以可能?——一种塞拉斯的方案

周靖   

  • 接受日期:2024-08-18 出版日期:2024-09-15 发布日期:2024-10-11
  • 作者简介:周靖,河南大学哲学与公共管理学院教授,哲学互鉴与中国话语建构研究中心研究员(郑州,450046)

On the Possibility of a Moral Community:A Sellarsian Approach

Jing Zhou   

  • Accepted:2024-08-18 Online:2024-09-15 Published:2024-10-11

摘要:

在探讨道德共同体形成可能性问题上,塞拉斯并未遵循经典方案,围绕“是”与“应当”的关系展开讨论,而是直接将“我们-意向”视为基本且初始的伦理意向。这种方法既避免了以现实但偶然的情感为起点,也避免了以普遍却非现实的先验法则为起点。塞拉斯从主体间性的角度出发,认为道德哲学的核心任务并非为从个体走向道德共同体奠定根据,因为真实的主体直接就是共同体内的一个成员。我们对世界的认识包含了我们对彼此关系的普遍理解,道德共同体的形成与伦理世界的构建是同一进程的两面。塞拉斯的立场挣脱了“是”与“应当”关系构成的枷锁,凸显了人本的精神,也为解决“我们为何必然成为规范的道德生物”这一问题提供了富有启发意义的独特见解。

关键词: 塞拉斯, 道德主体, 伦理生活, 规范性

Abstract:

Bypassing the classical scheme of “be” and “ought”, Sellars considers “we-intention” directly as the primary and primitive ethical intention in exploring how a moral community is possible. In this way, Sellars takes neither actual but contingent emotions nor universal but unrealistic a priori laws as a starting point. From an intersubjective perspective, Sellars argues that the main task of moral philosophy is not to find a way to move from the individual to the ethical community, since a genuine subject is immediately an individual of a community. Our perceptions of what the world is entail a generalized understanding of how we should treat one another. Forming a moral community and building an ethical world are two sides of the same process. Sellars’ position frees itself from the shackles of “be” and “ought”, highlights the spirit of humanity, and provides a unique and enlightening insight into how we are necessarily moral beings with normativity.

Key words: Sellars, moral subject, ethical life, normativity