Abstract:

In this global and plural age, toleration has often been regarded as the most important virtue one ought to cultivate toward people of different nationalities, ethnicities, religions, cultures, languages, geographical regions, and sextual orientations and their ways of life. This, however, is problematic, because one of the key elements of toleration is the objection to what one tolerates, and if toleration is a virtue, such objections must be based on good reasons instead of personal biases. Yet, clearly, we cannot have any reasonable objections toward people simply because their ways of life are different from ours in the above-mentioned senses. Therefore, the virtue we really need to cultivate is not toleration but the Zhuangzian respect. A person with such a virtue not only has no objection to what they respect and thus would not interfere with them but also, when needed, assist them to live their unique ways of life. This Zhuangzian respect differs from the respect that sometimes also serves as the basis of toleration. While the latter is only directed to others as persons and not to their ways of life, especially when they are very different from one’s own, the former is not only directed to others as persons but also to their ways of life, even if they are very different from one’s own.

Key words: toleration, respect, Zhuangzi, ethics of difference