Abstract:

How to differentiate between good and bad inferences has long been a central concern within the discipline of logic. In contrast to contemporary scholars who tend to adopt the inference rules or logical truths found in logic textbooks as normative guidelines for human inference, C. S. Peirce’s philosophical framework has two distinct characteristics: (1) the assessment of the validity of inferential practices must consistently align with the pursuit of truth-seeking goals, involving a scrutiny of the reasoning methodologies according to their professed adherence to specific patterns of reasoning; (2) the defense of normative standards for inference necessitates a transition from logic to other normative disciplines, such as ethics, signaling the inability of logic to take care of itself. These represent the basic commitments of Peirce’s logic as a normative theory of inference, and it is due to these commitments that Peirce successfully circumvents the inherent challenges posed by the problem of “theory choice” in contemporary philosophy of logic.

Key words: C. S. Peirce, human inference, normativity, logic