Abstract:

Bypassing the classical scheme of “be” and “ought”, Sellars considers “we-intention” directly as the primary and primitive ethical intention in exploring how a moral community is possible. In this way, Sellars takes neither actual but contingent emotions nor universal but unrealistic a priori laws as a starting point. From an intersubjective perspective, Sellars argues that the main task of moral philosophy is not to find a way to move from the individual to the ethical community, since a genuine subject is immediately an individual of a community. Our perceptions of what the world is entail a generalized understanding of how we should treat one another. Forming a moral community and building an ethical world are two sides of the same process. Sellars’ position frees itself from the shackles of “be” and “ought”, highlights the spirit of humanity, and provides a unique and enlightening insight into how we are necessarily moral beings with normativity.

Key words: Sellars, moral subject, ethical life, normativity