Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph ›› 2013, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (1): 32-37.

• 哲学 • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Intention, Reason, Action and Related Claims of Pragmatism

CHEN Ya-Jun   

  • Online:2013-01-15 Published:2013-03-27
  • Contact: CHEN Ya-Jun
  • About author: CHEN Ya-Jun

Abstract: An action is a performance with an intention while an intention may constitute a reason for the action. However, it is not true that each intention will constitute a reason of an action. Whether an intention is qualified to be a reason is not solely determined by an individual agent. In contrast, this involves a social perspective. From the social perspective, we can legitimately claim a reason rather than an intention of an action. An individual agent is responsible for the intention whereas the society ensures the reason. In an ideal action, its intention is compatible with its reason. An intention is not rational unless it is a consequence of a material inference, which is by no means private but formed in social practice and followed by the public. A material inference does not need to be reduced to a formal inference. The main difference between new and classical pragmatism is that the former cares more about how reason (language) affects an action, whereas the latter pays more attention to how an action affects reason (language). New pragmatism not only supplements but also diverges from classical pragmatism to some extent.