Journal of East China Normal University (Philosoph ›› 2018, Vol. 50 ›› Issue (3): 113-125.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2018.03.011

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Contract Reference Points, Executive Compensation Incentives and Excess Perquisites

YANG Rong   

  • Online:2018-05-15 Published:2018-05-22

Abstract:

Based on the contract as a reference point theory, this paper takes the data of China's listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as samples to study the relationships among contract reference points, compensation incentives and excess perquisites. We find that there is a positive relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites; compensation incentives benefit to reduce excess perquisites, and play a moderator role in inhibiting the relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites, with significant differences due to the elements of companies' ownership and manager market degree. The study also shows that compensation incentives of state-owned listed companies have a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between contract reference points and excess perquisites after the implementation of the "eight regulations" policy. The research findings can provide relevant evidences that support and guide how to design the contracts of executive compensations reasonably and solve the problem of excess perquisites effectively.

Key words: contract reference points, executive compensation incentives, excess perquisites, “eight regulations&rdquo, policy