华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2026, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (4): 96-109.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2026.04.010

• 法律研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

共同富裕与公司治理的转型:迈向劳资协作型治理模式

刘东辉   

  • 接受日期:2026-06-22 出版日期:2026-07-15 发布日期:2026-08-03
  • 作者简介:刘东辉,中国政法大学民商经济法学院副教授(北京,100088)
  • 基金资助:
    中国政法大学“青年教师学术创新团队支持计划”(项目编号:20CXTD08)。

Common Prosperity and the Transformation of Corporate Governance:Towards a Collaborative Employee-shareholder Governance Model

Donghui Liu   

  • Accepted:2026-06-22 Online:2026-07-15 Published:2026-08-03

摘要:

合理的公司治理能够为我国完善初次分配、推进共同富裕提供微观的物质与组织基础。极端的股东中心主义不仅不利于公司长期利益最大化,也会造成劳资分配失衡;与此相对,泛化的利益相关者保护也不具有可行性。适度的劳资协作型公司治理契合可持续发展与共同富裕的目标,能够促进企业效率与分配公平,提升劳动法的实施效能,实现股东与职工的合作共赢。我国虽然存在劳资协作的治理表象,但面临职工监事定位模糊、独立性不足,职工利润分享机制缺失,职工相关信息披露流于形式等挑战,无法兼顾效率与公平。在共同富裕的远景下,我国应适度纠偏短视的股东中心主义,以国有公司、上市公司完善ESG绩效为契机,在公司自治基础上从三方面稳步优化劳资协作型公司治理:第一,构建以职工保护为内核的职工董事制度,通过配置特别职权、参与薪酬委员会、地方工会选派代表等保障其独立履职;第二,激励特定类型的公司在章程中嵌入职工分享利益条款,并构建更加公平的上市公司员工持股制度;第三,构建强制性的职工相关信息披露制度,以投资者和职工重大性为基础设定具体的披露指标。这些优化措施需要劳动法、证券法和财税法的协同配合。

关键词: 共同富裕, 公司治理, 劳资协作, 职工董事, 员工持股

Abstract:

Reasonable corporate governance can provide a micro material and organizational basis for our country to improve primary distribution and promote common prosperity. Extreme shareholder centralism is not conducive to the maximization of the company’s long-term interests, but also causes an imbalance in the distribution of labor and capital; and generalized stakeholder protection is not feasible. For appropriate employee-shareholder cooperative corporate governance is in line with the goals of sustainable development and common prosperity, it can promote corporate efficiency and fair distribution, improve the implementation efficiency of labor laws, and achieve win-win cooperation between shareholders and employees. Although China has the appearance of employee-shareholder collaboration, it faces challenges such as vague positioning of employee supervisors, lack of independence, lack of employee profit sharing mechanism, and employee-related information disclosure as a mere formality, making it impossible to balance efficiency and fairness. Under the prospect of common prosperity, China should moderately correct short-sighted shareholder centralism, take the opportunity of state-owned companies and listed companies to improve ESG performance, and steadily optimize employee-shareholder cooperative corporate governance from the following three aspects on the basis of corporate autonomy: Firstly, building an employee director system with employee protection as the core, and ensuring their independent performance of duties by allocating special powers, requiring them to participate in remuneration committees, and selecting representatives from local trade unions; secondly, encouraging certain types of companies to embed employee benefit sharing clauses in their articles of association, and building a fairer employee stock ownership system for listed companies; thirdly, building a mandatory employee-related information disclosure system, and setting specific disclosure indicators based on the materiality of investors and employees. These optimization measures require the coordination of labor laws, securities laws, and fiscal and taxation laws.

Key words: common prosperity, corporate governance, employee-shareholder collaboration, employee directors, employee stock ownership