华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2005, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 34-40.

• 西方哲学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

偶然性与罗蒂新实用主义

潘德荣   

  • 收稿日期:2004-09-03 出版日期:2005-01-25 发布日期:2005-01-25
  • 作者简介:潘德荣(1951—),男,浙江长兴人,华东师范大学哲学系教授,博土生导师

Contingency and Rotty's Neo-Pragmatism

De-rong PAN   

  • Received:2004-09-03 Online:2005-01-25 Published:2005-01-25

摘要:

罗蒂是当代西方新实用主义的代表, 其哲学基础就是被绝对化了的“偶然性”概念。它包含了三个方面, 即语言的偶然性、自我的偶然性和自由主义社会的偶然性。罗蒂全面地解构了传统的认识论, 坚持以我们的信念与愿望作为真理的标准, 将人的想象力视为历史发展的真正动力。如果说罗蒂新实用主义之弊在于强化偶然而无视于必然, 那么传统的知识论则是强调了必然而或多或少淡化了偶然, 因而两者应当是互补的。就此而言, 他高扬偶然性, 注重实践与未来的理论精神, 对于我们的启迪意义远胜于被人们不断重复的“真理”。

关键词: 罗蒂, 新实用主义, 偶然性, 反认识论中心主义

Abstract:

Richard Rotty, an outstanding figure of contemporary Western neo-pragmatism, establishes his philosophy upon his absolutely radical understanding of "contingencies, "i.e. the contingency of language, of self and of liberal society.Since it is these contingencies rather than any law that constitute our material and mental world, any objective knowledge on essence or truth will be impossible.By deconstructing traditional epistemology in such a revolutionary way, Rotty claims that the criterion of truth lies in our beliefs and wishes, and the real momentum of history in our imagination.Rotty's neo-pragmatism and traditional epistemology may complement each other, because the former overstimates contingency, whereas the latter stresses necessity too much.In a sense, Rotty's philosophy, which emphasizes contingency, practice and future, is far more significant for us than a common understanding of truth.

Key words: Richard Rotty, neo-pragmatism, contingency, anti-epistemologism

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