华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2023, Vol. 55 ›› Issue (4): 144-161.doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2023.04.013

• 城镇化与城市发展 • 上一篇    

墙内开花墙外香吗——地方政府间标尺竞争策略研究

周波, 孔欣悦, 张超   

  • 接受日期:2023-06-16 出版日期:2023-07-15 发布日期:2023-08-01
  • 作者简介:周波,东北财经大学财政税务学院教授(大连,116025)|孔欣悦,通讯作者,东北财经大学财政税务学院博士研究生|张超,中煤矿山建设集团供应链有限公司员工(合肥,230031)
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目“财政分权、政府间经济职能分工与我国宏观经济稳定:生成机制、实证检验与改革方略选择”(项目编号:71873024)

Receiving Recognition Only from Outsiders?:Strategy Selection on Intergovernmental Yardstick Competition

Bo ZHOU, Xin-Yue KONG, Chao ZHANG   

  • Accepted:2023-06-16 Online:2023-07-15 Published:2023-08-01

摘要:

地方政府之间的标尺竞争,激发了它们发展经济、提高获取经济资源能力的积极性。由于原来以GDP为绩效考核指标存在的缺陷愈发明显以及我国日益重视实施创新驱动经济增长方式,转换地方政府之间竞争的绩效考核指标并重新定位地方政府间竞争的标尺,对我国经济社会高质量发展至关重要。有鉴于此,基于2011—2018年长三角及其邻近的105个城市面板数据,采用双重差分模型评估长三角一体化政策规划对区域创新的影响,探讨地方政府间竞争绩效考核指标和标尺选择的策略问题,结果发现:在长三角一体化政策激励下,长三角城市群的邻近城市将创新纳入标尺竞争的核心绩效考核指标,而长三角城市群的内部城市仍然以GDP为核心绩效考核指标;长三角城市群的邻近城市创新增长速度快于长三角城市群的内部城市,产生了墙内开花墙外香的效果,而且,创新能有效促进地方政府官员职位晋升;进一步分析表明,标尺选择应满足邻近性和标杆性。可见,为更好地提高我国经济和财政分权体制下地方政府间竞争的积极性和有效性,有关方面应注重标尺竞争绩效考核指标的长期性和创新性,并防止竞争扩大化现象,力争以地方政府间标尺竞争推进社会治理。

关键词: 标尺竞争, 长三角城市群, 绩效考核指标, 标杆性城市, 长三角一体化, 创新

Abstract:

Yardstick competition with GDP as the performance evaluation indicator between local governments has stimulated the enthusiasm of local governments to develop economy and improve their ability to obtain economic resources. With the increasingly obvious defects of the original indicators and China’s increasing emphasis on innovation-driven economic growth, changing performance evaluation indicators and repositioning yardsticks on yardstick competition between local governments are very important for China’s high-quality economic and social development. Given this, based on panel data of 105 cities in the Yangtze River Delta and its neighboring areas from 2011 to 2018, this paper uses a double difference model to evaluate the impact of the Yangtze River Delta integration policy planning on regional innovation, and discusses competitive strategy of selection of performance evaluation indicator and yardstick on competitions among local governments. The results show that neighboring cities of the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration have included innovation in their core performance indicators for yardstick competition, while cities in the Yangtze River Delta still use GDP as their core performance indicator. Under the incentive of the Yangtze River Delta integration policy, the growth rate of innovation in neighboring cities of the Delta is higher than that in cities of the Delta, producing an effect of “receiving recognition only from outsiders”, and the result that innovation can effectively promote the promotion of local officials. Further analysis shows that yardstick selection should satisfy proximity and benchmarking. This study reveals that in order to promote yardstick competition among local governments and its effectiveness under intergovernmental economic and fiscal decentralization framework of China, we should pay attention to the long-term and innovative nature of performance evaluation indicators, and prevent this competition from expanding, and promote social governance through yardstick competition.

Key words: Yardstick competition, Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration, performance evaluation indicators, benchmark cities, Yangtze River Delta integration, innovation